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Foreword
In January this year, the Pensions Institute moved to Cass Business School. This
provided an opportunity both to rebrand and to think anew about the work we
should undertake.  
Building on our international reputation for academic research, we decided to
start a new series of reports that focus on pensions issues of direct relevance to
pension practitioners, employers and policymakers. 
The first report in the series investigates the problems with delivering defined
contribution pensions to the employees of small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs). This is a key target for the government if its plan to change the balance
between state and private provision from 60:40 to 40:60 is to succeed. 
The report shows that providers and advisers are finding it increasingly
uneconomic to market to these companies and are withdrawing rather than
redoubling their efforts. This is an important and difficult issue for both
government and private sector providers.
I am delighted that Debbie Harrison and Alistair Byrne have taken the lead in
producing this report. I hope it will be the first of many such reports that dig
beneath the surface to discover exactly where the problems lie in the pensions
market and to make recommendations to resolve these difficulties.
I should stress that the views expressed in the report are those of the authors and
not necessarily those of the Pensions Institute, which itself takes no policy position.
Professor David Blake
Director, Pensions Institute
October  
Delivering DC?
      
Acknowledgments
The Pensions Institute would like to thank the following organisations for their help
with the research for this report. We would also like to thank the employers and
advisers who preferred to remain anonymous.
Delivering DC?
Advisory & Brokerage (now part of Origen)  
Alexander Forbes Financial Services
Annuity Bureau
Annuity Direct
Aon
Aspen
Association of British Insurers
Association of Consulting Actuaries
Axa
Brainwaves
Barnett Waddingham Investment Services
B&CE Benefits
Cazalet Consulting
Chartwell
Consumers Association
Department of Trade and Industry
Department for Work and Pensions
Distribution Technology 
Fidelity
Financial Services Authority
Friends Provident
FTSE International
Gissings
Hargreaves Lansdown
Hewitt Bacon & Woodrow
HSBC 
Hymans Robertson
Invesco
Investment Solutions
John Scott & Partners
Lane Clark & Peacock
Legal & General
Mellon Human Resources 
Mercer Human Resources
Momentum (now part of Origen)
National Association of Pension Funds
Norwich Union
Pensions Commission
Pensions Trust
PIFC
Pre Retirement Association
Prudential
Punter Southall Financial Management
RMB International
RSM Robson Rhodes
Sainsbury 
Scottish Equitable
Scottish Life
Scottish Widows
Standard Life
Talking People
TUC
Watson Wyatt 
Wesleyan
Winterthur
Wentworth Rose (now part of Origen)
William Burrows Annuities
Wolanski & Co
     
Preface
This is the first Pensions Institute report for pension practitioners, employers and
policymakers. It provides primary research and analysis of the barriers to
participation at adviser, provider, employer and employee levels in the company-
sponsored defined contribution (DC) pension market. In these pages you will
discover how the market works in practice, rather than in theory. 
An important feature of this research is that it is based on interviews with a wide
range of organisations, conducted on the understanding that information
provided and opinions expressed would be quoted on a non-attributable basis.
This methodology enables us to “tell it how it is” rather than report the diluted
attributable responses that would have emerged after interviewees had consulted
their public relations, compliance, and legal departments. 
As such the findings and recommendations of this report are at times
uncomfortable and controversial but we hope they will shed light on what have
hitherto been perceived as inexplicable gaps in information and understanding,
for organisations as diverse as the Department for Work and Pensions, the
Treasury, the National Association of Pension Funds, and the TUC.
In the light of our findings the government must understand that if no changes are
made to the way company-sponsored pensions are delivered in the smaller and
medium sized business market it will not succeed in significantly extending pension
provision and has virtually no chance of achieving its ambition to change the
40:60, private/state benefit dependency ratio, to 60:40 by the year 2050. Our
evidence demonstrates that the government has not recognised where the real
barriers to participation lie for smaller and medium sized companies, and that it
does not consider seriously the views of advisers that work in, and understand, this
tough market. 
Our objective is to identify where the real barriers to participation lie so that the
government, employers and practitioners can work together to improve the design
and delivery of DC pension schemes. We believe providers and advisers may be
able to achieve these objectives by adopting the recommendations set out in this
report. Whether these organisations are able to extend best practice to the smaller
employers, particularly those with predominantly lower paid employees, is
questionable unless we can make multi-employer schemes genuinely attractive for
all parties concerned.
For employers, the decision to improve take-up is extremely problematical.
Advisers and providers are not interested in schemes where the employer makes
no contribution but in any contribution-matching scheme (where the employer and
employee pay an equivalent or similar rate) the cost implications of higher
employee participation are significant and immediate. We believe many
employers – and in particular finance directors – will only seek to increase take-up
on a voluntary basis if it can be demonstrated clearly that their investment will
reap dividends in terms of employee satisfaction, appreciation, and continuing
service. This is one of the biggest challenges we face. For right or for wrong, the
assumption that pension schemes help to recruit and retain good staff has been
questioned and dismissed by many of our interviewees.
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Our research focuses on smaller and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and the
providers and advisers that service this vast and diverse market. In the following
pages we set out our definition of SMEs but broadly these are companies (both
quoted and private) and partnerships below the FTSE 350 index, which denotes
the unofficial market division for consultants, insurance companies and asset
managers. In practice the “solutions” offered to larger companies – particularly
those presented by major consultants to the FTSE 100 companies – are simply not
available to SMEs. As one such consultant succinctly explained: “There’s not
enough money in it”.
Pension problems are not exclusive to SMEs: far from it. However, the
management and cost implications of pension provision for smaller and medium
sized employers are very different from those that affect the larger companies.
FTSE 350 employers – and equivalent private and foreign companies that are not
listed on the London Stockmarket – have a commercial reputation to maintain.
They wish – indeed need – to be seen as socially responsible employers. These
companies have a very wide range of stakeholders and customers to consider.
They are likely to have a much broader choice of options and resources to enable
them to withstand financial problems with defined benefit (DB) schemes. At the
same time they can afford to invest significantly in the promotion of their new
defined contribution (DC) schemes. Clearly these factors are recognised by the
advisers and providers that operate in this lucrative segment of the market. 
This unofficial market segmentation has serious implications for the government’s
pensions policy. We suggest that if this divide cannot be breached, for reasons of
commerce and profit, then at the very least it should be explicit and publicly
debated, so that policymakers keen to increase pension participation among
SMEs can develop workable solutions with the organisations that actually operate
in this market.
Throughout this report our approach is to identify and assess the current
problems, to offer observations and insights, and to recommend pragmatic ways
forward. We do not believe there is a range of perfect models for the design and
delivery of DC that would draw the universal support of employers, policymakers
and practitioners, and so sensible compromises must be agreed – again by those
prepared to do the work. 
We hope you will find this report illuminating in its fresh approach to
contemporary pension problems. 
Debbie Harrison, 
Senior Visiting Fellow, The Pensions Institute
Debbie.Harrison@city.ac.uk
Alistair Byrne
Fellow, The Pensions Institute
A.Byrne@city.ac.uk
David Blake
Director, The Pensions Institute
D.Blake@city.ac.uk 
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Executive Summary
The key messages of this report are as follows:
The government must understand that if no changes are made to the way
employer-sponsored DC pension schemes are designed and delivered in the
smaller and medium sized company market it will not significantly extend pension
provision and has virtually no chance of achieving its ambition to change the
40:60 private/state benefit dependency ratio, to 60:40 by the year 2050.
Our evidence demonstrates that the government has not recognised where the
real barriers to participation lie for smaller and medium sized companies, and
that it does not consider seriously the views of advisers that work in, and
understand, this tough market. 
At present a complex and interrelated series of factors denies access to affordable
and effective company pension provision to millions of people in the low-to-
average earnings bracket in the smaller and medium sized company market.
These factors include:
• The finance director’s reluctance to pay a company contribution to its pension 
scheme. FDs are not convinced by the traditional rationale for running a 
pension scheme, namely that it helps to recruit, retain and motivate high-quality 
staff. Given this lack of conviction, for FDs the pension scheme does not 
represent a measurable return on investment.
• The barriers imposed by the government’s means testing system, which 
discourages employers, advisers and providers from promoting membership to 
low-to-average earners.
• The withdrawal of advisers and providers from companies with fewer than 
50-100 employees due to negligible profit margins. 
• The fact that where providers do sell to “less attractive” smaller companies, with 
low-to-average earning employees, they impose an above-average annual 
management charge to compensate for the lack of economies of scale. 
• The commission war among pension providers, which started with the 
introduction of stakeholder schemes in 2001, encourages advisers in the SME 
market to select only those providers that pay above-average commission rates. 
Several major pension providers that either do not pay commission or do not 
pay sufficiently high rates, are ignored by advisers.
• Companies selected for their commission terms also provide the main default 
investment option – typically a managed unit linked fund – in which 80%-90% of
members invest from the date they join the scheme to the date they retire. These 
funds do not adhere to clear performance benchmarks, nor do they necessarily 
provide relevant risk profiles for the long-term and the changing requirements of
members over the course of their working lives.
• The lack of “at retirement” services for members, most of whom accept their 
provider’s annuity, which could offer an income 25%-30% lower than the best 
available rates.
The following eight summaries relate to the main research sections that start on
page 18. 
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1.Finance directors actively discourage high employee participation rates
In smaller companies finance directors hold the pension purse strings, with human
resources (HR) playing a very secondary role. Finance directors (FDs) are not
convinced by the traditional HR argument that pension schemes attract, retain,
and motivate staff, and in many cases impose strict limitations on the target
employee participation rate in their defined contribution (DC) schemes. This point
is confirmed by advisers, consultants, and pension providers to the very large
schemes as well as to SMEs. In this respect the FD represents a very significant
barrier to wider private pension participation in the company-sponsored market.
The restriction on participation is highly relevant to the control of cash flow and
payroll costs. Where the employer offers a contribution match, the company incurs
costs that increase directly in proportion to the number of employees who join the
scheme. 
It is important to appreciate that the finance director is not opposed to costs per se,
but to costs that do not deliver a measurable benefit to the company. Independent
financial advisers, employee benefits consultants, and pension providers are
unanimous in their view that it is impossible to demonstrate the link between the
availability of an attractive pension scheme and reduced staff turnover or
improved staff performance. This is a fundamental problem and one that the
government and pensions industry must address if we are to encourage, rather
than force, further employer support.
Unless we can convince finance directors that an employer contribution to the
pension scheme provides a good return on the investment, empty stakeholder
boxes will continue to represent only the more visible part of the problem. It is
clear from our research that employers that appear to provide an attractive
scheme, in practice can ensure low take-up through lack of endorsement, lack of
time for communications, and by imposing a high minimum employee
contribution rate. Under the current voluntary system it is very easy for employers
to obey the letter of the law while ignoring its spirit.
We note that while pensions for the workforce may not be a priority for finance
directors, we understand that they usually secure individual advice for themselves
and key executives. 
2.Means testing,market forces and the threat of regulatory penalties deny
millions access to schemes 
Between 4.5m and 7m employees, corresponding to 16% - 25% of the working
population, effectively are excluded from the opportunity to save in company
schemes due to two separate but interrelated issues: 
• There is a widespread fear on the part of advisers and employers of mis-selling 
the company scheme to lower earners who might be better off claiming means-
tested benefits in retirement. This all-pervasive fear results in the exclusion of 
employees who would more than likely benefit from scheme membership. The 
perception of the means testing system as complex and impenetrable is as much
a problem as the way the system actually works in practice. 
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• Providers and advisers are withdrawing at a rapid pace from the smaller 
employer market due to the lack of profit. Typically providers are moving to an 
implicit minimum of 50 employees. Where a high proportion of employees are 
on national average earnings or less, this minimum is likely to be about 100. 
The exclusion on the grounds of low earnings extends to the individual market too.
The government has been shielded from appreciating the extent of
disenfranchisement because the insurance companies that traditionally have
provided products in the retail and small company market are unlikely to admit in
public that they operate a covert exclusion policy, since this would harm their
reputation as “household names”.
Our research also reveals the stark fact that employees in companies considered
relatively unattractive by providers (as a result of low overall numbers and a low
earnings profile) have to pay a higher annual management charge (AMC) than
employees in more “profitable” schemes. 
3.The first “DC boomer” generation will hit retirement in 3-6 years.We do
not have the systems in place to cope
At-retirement planning for SMEs is under-researched and inadequate. The first
“DC boomer” generation will start to hit retirement between 2007 and 2010. This
group includes employees in their 50s who were persuaded or required to switch
from the company defined benefit (DB) scheme into the new defined contribution
(DC) scheme as early as 1990, when advisers first started recommending these
DB-to-DC conversions. 
The major DC-boomers are those currently in their mid- to late-40s. In 15 years’
time this generation will hit retirement and the need for advice on annuity
purchase and the use of open market options (OMO) will increase significantly.
In the light of these facts we believe practitioners and employers should address
urgently how best to deliver the OMO to all employees with DC funds. It makes no
sense to promote DC without ensuring that each individual has access to the
optimal annuity at retirement, both in terms of rate and design. At present those
with comparatively small funds – less than £50,000 – are unlikely to be offered the
OMO on attractive terms. (The average annuity purchase currently is about
£40,000.) Instead they will be restricted to the annuities offered by the pension
provider, which may not offer enhanced and impaired life rates. 
This means that the 25%-30% improvement that can be achieved by using the
open market option is denied to more than half of those with DC pension
arrangements, while those with a health condition or relevant lifestyle feature may
be missing out on even greater enhanced and impaired rates.
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4.The commission system creates bias in the scheme choice and design 
There is no doubt that the smaller benefits consultants and corporate IFAs that
serve the SME market are strongly biased towards contract-based group personal
pensions (GPPs) and stakeholder schemes. 
None of the advisers interviewed offers “risk-sharing” schemes such as career
average or cash balance. This is partly because these schemes are complex to
administer and require ongoing actuarial input. But it is also because they are
difficult to communicate to members. Where the adviser is paid a commission that
is based on the total employee/employer annual contributions, achieving a high
take-up rate among members is essential in order to obtain maximum
remuneration. DC is much easier to communicate to employees than risk-share
schemes and therefore provides greater potential for higher employee
participation and the associated sales commissions.  
5. Insurers pay “crippling” rates of commission to buy market share
At the time of writing only seven of the 35 stakeholder providers whose schemes
are open to new business were genuinely active in the SME market on a national
scale. These providers admit they pay “crippling” rates of commission in a bid to
buy market share. These commissions can be worth up to 35% of the total
employer/employee contributions paid during the first year. Such up-front
remuneration levels cannot be met out of the provider’s annual management
charge, which typically is 0.8% but often less.
We predict that competition and the pressure on profit margins will trigger
mergers that will reduce the stakeholder/group personal pension provider market
to about five companies in total – nationally and not just within the SME market.
The economics of running low premium, high volume business suggest a small
number of very large players is the most likely long-term outcome.
6.Commission bias leads to unsatisfactory and inappropriate investment
default options 
The vast majority of employees (85%-90%) passively accept the provider’s default
investment option. Typically this would be a life office managed unit-linked fund,
tracker fund or a with-profits fund. Members who opt for the default fund rarely
switch, and so they will remain in this fund until they retire – that is, for young
joiners, for up to 40 years.
The life offices that pay high rates of commission and subsequently provide these
default funds are not among the top performing asset managers. Their managed
unit-linked funds – the most common default option – are designed with reference
to peer group benchmarks that hug the index, rather than match the risk/reward
requirements and investment horizons of scheme members. In addition, there is
considerable variation in the “lifestyle” mechanism that switches the individual
away from equities and into safer, less volatile assets in the few years before
retirement. This will also have a significant impact on the outcome.
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These factors raise questions about the screening processes being used by
advisers and about the due diligence they undertake to ensure that the default
funds they select are the most suitable for the majority of a scheme’s members. 
Advisers say they recognise that asset allocation is a major determinant of the
resulting retirement income yet they also admit that they are “not particularly
interested” in the finer details of the default fund, provided it offers “average”
returns over 3-5 years, measured within the life office managed fund sector. 
7.An employee contribution level above 4%-5% is a barrier to participation
While policymakers recognise the need for higher contribution levels to help
individuals achieve an adequate retirement income, for many employees anything
above 4%-5% is a significant barrier to take-up. 
Raising the employee contribution rate to improve prospective retirement incomes,
therefore, is likely to be counter-productive and could result in people leaving the
scheme. This is an important and difficult issue for the government to tackle in its
debate over voluntary vs. compulsory contributions.
Probably the most compelling strategy to solve this problem is where employees
agree to direct part of their future wage increases into their pension plans. The
(limited) US evidence suggests the Save More Tomorrow ™ (SMART) idea works
well. The key contributing factor is “money illusion” – that take home pay never
falls  – and the scheme uses the inertia shown by many pension scheme members
to positive effect. Even if employees are prepared to allocate 1% of salary from
their annual pay rise over a period of a few years this will have a very meaningful
impact on the resulting retirement income.
If methods of raising the participation and contribution rates are not implemented,
the state (i.e. the taxpayer) will have to pick up the tab in terms of means tested
benefit claims in the years to come. It is the future taxpayer therefore who faces the
consequences of the current problems with poorly designed and poorly funded
private sector pension schemes. This, of course, is what the “pensions timebomb”
is really about.
8.Communication rather than scheme design is the key to take-up; regulation
of advice is a barrier  
The fear of inadvertently offering regulated advice is a barrier to communications
for both the employer and the adviser. The fact that the difference between
regulated advice – which must have a due diligence audit trail – and non-
regulated generic advice, is not understood or even recognised by the employee,
drives a coach and horse through this aspect of the regulation system. 
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Smaller and medium sized companies defined
The primary focus for the government’s pensions initiatives is to increase
participation rates in the workplace where there is no cover or minimal coverage
at present. A key target is the small and medium sized business or enterprise
(SME), which is the subject of this report. 
There is no single definition of SME and in practice advisers to smaller and
medium sized companies tend to identify potential clients in terms of both the
number of employees and the earnings profile. 
However, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) classifies smaller firms as
those that employ up to 250 staff and this is our preferred definition, although to
accommodate the business strategy of the larger advisers and consultants in the
SME market we included data and observations that relate to employers with up to
1000 employees.1 According to the Office for National Statistics there are about
416,000 enterprises employing between 1 and 1000 people, giving a total of
11m employees.2 The number of people employed at the end of Quarter 2, 2004
was 24m, and so the market for this report covers over 40% of this total.3
Many of these enterprises will grow in significance to the economy. As the
Association of Consulting Actuaries points out, “The importance of pension trends
in the smaller firms sector is therefore clear in terms of the coverage of employees
and the potential of some of these firms to be the larger firms of the future.”4
Delivering DC?
           
Advisers and employee benefits consultants defined
With the growth of company-sponsored defined contribution (DC) schemes across
all sectors and in companies of all sizes, the traditional division between the retail
and institutional pension markets and their advisers has broken down. This is
particularly noticeable in the SME market where large firms of independent
financial advisers (IFAs), which are remunerated by the pension provider in the
form of sales commission, compete for business with the traditionally fee-based
smaller and medium sized employee benefits consultants (EBCs). 
While EBCs historically have worked on a fee basis whereby they are remunerated
by their clients – the employers – today most firms in the SME market recognise
that these employers either cannot pay large fees up-front due to cash flow
problems, or simply will not oblige. Therefore the majority of EBCs in this market
quote a fee but in practice accept sales commission in lieu. 
A second differentiator that no longer applies is that EBCs traditionally have been
authorised by the Institute of Actuaries, whereas IFAs are authorised by the
Financial Services Authority. Many EBCs now recognise that DC can require
individual counselling and have sought FSA authorisation in order to offer
regulated advice. This can be in addition to or instead of IA authorisation.
In this report we use the term “adviser” to denote both IFA and EBC, except where
the business culture is of specific relevance. We focus on 15 advisers in particular
that have the potential to offer national coverage, although these firms vary
considerably in size and scope. We have also interviewed the major consultants
and consider the relevance of their views in relation to SMEs.   
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Providers defined
“Providers” refers to a range of financial institutions that are permitted to sell
pension schemes and plans. These organisations perform a range of functions,
for example:
• They receive and invest the contributions into a pension scheme or plan
• They administer the scheme or plan
• They provide an income in retirement in the form of an annuity or a drawdown 
facility. 
Insurance companies and, to a lesser extent, unit trust and investment trust
groups, offer the first two services. Only insurance companies can sell annuities in
the UK, but a much wider range of organisations offers drawdown, as this does
not involve annuity purchase. 
Most, but not all, insurance companies and asset managers pay commission to
intermediaries on group business. 
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The research 
This section sets out our research in detail and provides extensive commentary
from the marketplace. In addition, we offer comment and recommendations
where appropriate. 
The opinions and observations provided by interviewees are in italics and are
quoted on a non-attributable basis. To help the reader place these comments in
context we indicate the type of organisation quoted as follows: 
EBC – employee benefits consultant
IFA – independent financial adviser
P – life office or other pension provider, for example an asset manager
O – other organisation, for example a regulatory, trade, professional or consumer body. 
As we explained earlier and also discuss in Section 4, the distinction between IFA
and EBC is somewhat arbitrary in the smaller company-sponsored pensions
market. Nevertheless we decided to use these different classifications as this still
has a bearing on the remuneration strategy and the products recommended to
corporate clients.
Where we discuss the cost of a pension contribution to the employer for simplicity
we use gross figures. In practice these payments would be tax-deductible.
We use the term “contribution match” to denote an employer contribution that is
equal (or similar) to the employee’s – for example a 5% of annual earnings
employer contribution would be paid for every employee who joined and agreed
to pay 5%.
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Section 1. 1. Finance directors actively discourage high
employee participation rates
1.1 FDs, not HR,hold the pension purse strings
There has been a radical change in the way pension costs are perceived and
managed by employers compared with 10 and even five years ago. Few SMEs
have a dedicated pensions department. Historically the company pension scheme
was regarded as a human resources function and was seen as part of the benefits
package used to attract, retain and motivate staff, and also as a retirement
management tool. Today in many smaller companies in particular, the role of the
finance director overrides that of the HR manager. FDs regard pensions as a
company cost rather than a company benefit.
Advisers to SMEs confirm that increasingly they find themselves dealing directly
with the FD. Given the cost and risk issues associated with the pension scheme, the
MD and CEO may also be part of the discussion, with HR playing a very
secondary role.
“If we are talking to HR they will be very enthusiastic about the pension scheme.FDs
tend to be lukewarm at best.” IFA
Advisers report that finance directors like DC because it has a quantifiable cost but
that this explicit price tag makes pension participation in the workforce an easy
target for cost analysis and containment. 
“The reason we get the opportunity to carry out a review of existing schemes is that we
tell the FD we expect to be able to offer an alternative that will save the company money
as well as improve value for members. It’s the former rather than the latter that interests
them.” IFA
Finance directors in SMEs regard cash flow and cost control as critical to the
company’s profitability. To help reduce the cost of pensions, in the majority of
cases they expect the advisers to be remunerated by the providers’ commission. 
“The FD doesn’t want to pay for advice and is more likely to be attracted to the
commission-basis where the member bears the costs rather than pay a company fee.” IFA
FDs are also likely to restrict the amount of time the adviser is allowed to
communicate the scheme to employees, as this takes staff away from their work.
“We explain we need at least three months to communicate to employees the closure of
the old scheme, the start of the new scheme and all the complex issues that arise as a
result.With DB to DC transition we need five months because most employees do not
understand their DB scheme in the first place and at the same time they see a change in
their benefits as threatening.The FD wants it all done in two weeks and expects a
reduction in the cost if we reduce the communications process.” EBC
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1.2 Advisers screen potential clients very carefully
Advisers in the SME market (see Section 3 below) are often described by the major
consultants as commission-driven salespeople – the implication being that they
could go anywhere and sell anything.
In practice it appears that advisers are very discerning in their selection of
corporate clients and the attitude of the company’s decision maker is a key issue.
Clearly, it is in the adviser’s best interests to sell to employers prepared to make a
contribution and to support the communications process, although this is also true
of the major EBCs in the FTSE 350 market. 
“We find out very quickly about the benefits culture in the organisation.The pro-
benefits conversations are likely to be with the HR manager, but in many of the
companies we deal with HR doesn’t have board representation.The HR manager
reports to the finance director and so the FD has the whip hand.” IFA
In selecting clients, the age, financial sophistication, and average earnings level of
employees is also relevant to the potential for a high take-up, as is the company
structure and location. Where there is commitment to pensions at head office
(which translates into high participation rates in that location), this often fails to
follow through to the company’s other sites. Where the site operates its own
payroll and profit and loss accounts, the employer’s contribution will undermine
performance unless it is given special recognition and separated from the payroll
accounting.
1.3 FDs want to see a return on investment
It is important to recognise that the finance director is not opposed to costs per se,
but to costs that do not deliver a measurable benefit to the company.
“FDs can be quite happy to spend money on a sick-leave management service  –
usually a helpline to deal confidentially with employees’ concerns.This is because the
provider can demonstrate a cut in the number of employee sick days and therefore can put
a monetary value on the savings.But with the pension scheme it is impossible to
demonstrate the return on investment. Studies that try to achieve this go so far and then
collapse in a heap.” EBC
“It’s impossible to prove to FDs the cost benefits of the pension scheme.Unfortunately it
is very easy to prove the opposite. If you ask employees whether they would like to have
a pension scheme or would prefer an extra 5-10% of salary, they will always go for the
cash in hand.” O
Employers that offer a contribution match incur costs that increase directly in
proportion with the number of employees who join the scheme. For a company
with 2000 employees earning national (full time) average earnings of £25,000
raising the participation rate from 30% to 90% would increase the cost of
employer contributions from £750,000 to £2.25m assuming an employer
contribution of 5% (in line with the average reported in NAPF 2003 Annual Survey,
although in practice the employer contribution is less in the SME market.)  
Delivering DC?
            
One of the problems finance directors have with DC is that the cost is not flexible. 
“The employer’s contribution is not a flexible cost on a month by month basis but it is
fixed. Smaller companies often have short-term cash flow problems but they know if they
delay a pension contribution payment they will get into trouble with OPRA [the
Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority].” EBC
Advisers across the board say that with the employer’s commitment they can
achieve over 90% participation. Many employers say that they do not want this
level of take-up due to the cost.
If the finance director is unconvinced by the argument in favour of pension
contributions, he or she is likely to impose strict limitations on the target
participation rate. In this way, the FD represents a very significant barrier to wider
participation.
“We have to have a very serious discussion with the employer.We tell them that
typically our worksite marketing proposition will take the participation rate from its
current level of, say, 30%, to over 90%.Where there is an employer contribution this will
have an immediate cost.We have to ask them how much they really want to pay.” EBC
“The employer needs to make it clear which sections of the workforce we should target.
We have to be careful of anti-discrimination laws but we can vary the way we present
from group to group.” EBC
“As an adviser we can lose a contract by being too successful.” EBC
The Department for Work and Pensions is examining whether automatic
enrolment would increase participation significantly. Under this system employees
are automatically enrolled in the scheme but can opt out. Several advisers already
recommend automatic enrolment but report that few employers are keen to adopt
the procedure.
“One of the easiest ways to secure a high take-up is to use automatic enrolment – so
employees are in unless they make an active decision to opt out. FDs don’t want this.”
IFA
“No FD is going to agree to automatic enrolment. If it becomes mandatory there are
ways to ensure that it is quick, easy and attractive for the employees to opt out.” IFA
Another initiative the DWP is piloting is active decisions. This is where the employer
gives employees a short and fixed period of time during which they must decide to
make a positive decision to join or decline membership. Employees are not
allowed time to forget they have to make the decision or to make excuses by
claiming they have lost the paperwork. Again, this practice is in use.
“Where we have the full support of HR and the company genuinely wants a high
participation rate we can secure this by using active decision forms.These set out the
benefits the employee is agreeing to forego.We make it sound important and that the
decision has legal connotations.With the right wording it can be much easier and less
worrying for the employee to sign a simplified enrolment form than to sign an agreement
confirming their decision not to join.Unfortunately employers that let us take this
approach are very rare.” IFA
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Employers recognise that there are ways of making an apparently attractive
scheme unappealing. The employee contribution level is a primary example.
“I was once asked to design a scheme that was very attractive from an HR point of view,
so that the HR team could promote the fact that they offered a great scheme, but at the
same time I was asked to ensure that not everyone would join.The solution was to have
quite a high employee contribution,which always acts as a barrier to participation.” EBC
Even among the paternalistic larger companies the commitment to the pension
scheme can be questionable. As part of their image such companies like to be
seen to be offering attractive pensions but in many cases this is as far as it goes.
“These days most employers recognise that all they have to do is to offer a pension
scheme. In practice there can be a huge gap between making a scheme available and
actually promoting it in an effective way.” EBC
“In a lot of cases it would cripple a FTSE 350 company – let alone a smaller employer
– if everyone joined the pension scheme.The true cost of 100% participation would be
unaffordable.” EBC
1.4 The employer’s endorsement represents a contribution of money and time
In practice participation rates are closely linked to the employer’s, and in
particular the finance director’s, support and endorsement of the scheme.
Advisers and providers require a strong commitment from the employer if they are
to make a profit from the promotion and distribution of pensions in the workplace. 
In this respect the objectives of the adviser and provider are aligned with those of
the employees. For both parties we can identify employer commitment in terms of
money and time as follows: 
• The availability of an employer contribution (money). Without an employer 
contribution, advisers say they are not prepared to take on the client. 
• The facility for learning about the scheme in group presentations, “surgeries” 
(where employees can make an appointment to discuss an issue), and one-to-
one counselling sessions (time). Advisers report that employers vary 
considerably in terms of the time they are prepared to allow for staff to be away 
from their work. 
1.5 FDs look after their own pensions
While pensions for the workforce may not be a priority for finance directors, they
usually secure individual advice for themselves and key executives. 
“We provide individual counselling for the FDs and key executives.They are responsible
for choosing the default investment fund for the workforce but are unlikely to invest in it
themselves. Instead they want an open architecture range of top funds.” IFA
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Comment
We can now see why so many stakeholder boxes are empty, but this is not the only
problem. It is clear from our research that employers that appear to provide an
attractive scheme, in practice can ensure low take-up through lack of
endorsement, lack of time for communications, and a high employee contribution
rate. Under the current voluntary system it is easy for employers to obey the letter
of the law while ignoring its spirit.
The TUC has recently conducted research to find out how often employers referred
to their pension contribution in job advertisements. The TUC expressed surprise at
the general absence of this feature and wanted to know why it is that so many
companies do not promote the employer pension contribution. We hope the
above goes some way towards answering the TUC’s question.5
There are two points we wish to make in this section.
1A. Employers require empirical evidence of the return on investment in a
pension scheme
Practitioners and the government must recognise that many employers no longer
accept the traditional view that a generous pension scheme attracts, retains and
motivates employees. In the modern labour market, an employee’s value tends to
be measured in terms of performance, not loyalty. As the consultant Hewitt Bacon
& Woodrow pointed out in its 2004 DC survey, the top three objectives in setting
up a DC scheme are purely financial: to reduce the company’s exposure to risk, to
control pension cost, and reduce pension cost.6
Finance directors want to see a return on investment. They require operational
efficiency in all aspects of the company and this includes the pension scheme. If
we retain a voluntary system then there is a clear need for research that can
provide empirical evidence that membership of a pension scheme encourages
staff to stay put.7 We do not know if this is achievable.
To assist in this matter – and to improve their own accounting for company costs –
employers should be encouraged to set clear targets for their annual pensions
budget. The Association of Consulting Actuaries (ACA) 2004 report on smaller
firms and their pension arrangements states that only one in three employers does
this and where they do the target is low – averaging 7% of payroll, but with more
than four in ten companies setting this target at 5% or less.8
The attitude of employers is driven partly by the acceptable norm for each sector.
In an illuminating survey from RSM Robson Rhodes on company-sponsored
pensions in the manufacturing sector, four in ten companies do not actively
encourage non-joiners to participate, while over half of companies surveyed do
not revisit scheme membership nor do they conduct or facilitate regular pension
workshops.9
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1.B Anti-discrimination rules may raise participation where the employer is
reluctant
We are not convinced that if the DWP made automatic enrolment or active
decisions mandatory that this would necessarily raise participation. Employers can
and will find ways around this, simply by manipulating the wording of the forms
themselves or by imposing a high employee contribution rate as a deterrent.
The question, therefore, is how can the government promote increased
participation rates in situations where the employer is unwilling? Compulsion is
one answer: the government could simply require employees to pay pension
contributions for their employees, but this approach does little to engage
employees in the process. 
A better solution might be to create incentives for the employer to encourage
employees to join the plan and to find a way to penalise them when they don’t. 
In the US 401(k) market this is done quite simply by restricting the amount of 
tax advantaged pension contributions that highly paid managers can pay into 
the pension plan to a multiple of what the rest of the workforce contributes. If
employees don’t join the plan, or contribute only at low rates, managers can find
their own ability to contribute severely limited. 
There is no real equivalent in the UK. Employers have to contribute at least 3% of
salary to a group personal pension (GPP) for each employee in order to avoid the
requirement to designate a stakeholder pension for their employees, but the
requirement of designation doesn’t act as a sanction. The tax limits on pension
contributions in the UK are high (and will get higher in April 2006) which confers
almost unlimited scope on high earners to provide for their retirement on a tax-
advantaged basis. The introduction of some kind of anti-discrimination rules could
be an effective way of making sure those in the top levels of a company have a
vested interest in raising participation throughout the workforce. 
A number of US companies, “motivated” by anti-discrimination rules, have used
design mechanisms that exploit the findings from recent studies in the field of
behavioural economics to raise participation and contribution rates.10 These
mechanisms recognise the importance of such psychological traits as inertia and
lack of willpower.  
Inertia is particularly relevant. US literature demonstrates that inertia on the part of
pension scheme members is a significant barrier to joining, making the investment
choice and selecting the contribution level, among other points.11 Therefore, it is
not just a question of how informed people are, but how motivated they are to do
something about it. Auto enrolment and Save More Tomorrow TM represent positive
ways to avoid the inertia trap. Indeed, they can be used to get inertia to work in
favour of continued participation.
We suspect that, given the finance directors’ interest in their own retirement
planning, they might be more amenable to processes that overcome inertia in the
main workforce if this is the only way they can avoid the anti-discrimination rules.
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Section 2. Means testing, market forces and the threat of
regulatory penalties deny millions access to schemes 
2.1 Fear of mis-selling and lack of profitability exclude lower earners
Millions of employees effectively are excluded from the opportunity to save in
company schemes due to two separate but interrelated issues: 
• There is a widespread fear on the part of advisers and employers of mis-selling 
the company scheme to lower earners who might be better off claiming means-
tested benefits in retirement. This broad-brush approach also excludes 
employees who would benefit from scheme membership.
• Providers and advisers are withdrawing at a rapid pace from the smaller 
employer market due to inadequate economies of scale. For some providers the 
minimum is employers with at least 50 employees. In practice, where a high 
proportion of employees are on national average earnings or less, this 
minimum is likely to be about 100.
It is important that policymakers understand that the annual management charge
(AMC) is extremely variable and will depend on the adviser’s negotiating muscle
plus the scheme profile, particularly in respect of the numbers of low earners who
join the scheme. Providers consider the following key details: average age and
salary, the number of employees, and the employer’s commitment. It will set its
AMC in relation to the expected volume of annual premium business and in
relation to expected persistency (that is, how long it can rely on the annual
contributions being maintained). 
The stark fact is that lower earning employees, where they are offered
membership, will generally have to pay a higher AMC than above average or
even just average earners because they are less attractive to the provider.
2.2 Confusion over means-tested benefits encourages advisers to avoid all
lower earners  
Under the current means-testing regime – which includes the pension credit –
employers and their advisers are deeply concerned that they may inadvertently
mis-sell membership of the company scheme to lower earners who might later
discover they would have been better off relying on state benefits. This issue is
particularly serious where an employee pays pension contributions that might
otherwise have been used to pay off his/her debts.
Our research indicates that as a conservative estimate the 6.6 million working age
adults who earn £15,00012 or less would need to build up a fund in excess of
£100,000 by state pension age in order to buy a large enough annuity to take
them out of the pensions tax credit bracket. This would provide an annual pension
of about £4,800. To rise above all means testing benefits, including housing
benefits, individuals would need a fund of about £160,000, which would provide
a pension of about £7,500.13
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There is very little chance that most employees in this earnings bracket will
generate anywhere near such large funds. Those who build up smaller funds and
who reach retirement while the pensions credit still applies will lose the benefit of
up to 40% of their savings. For basic rate taxpayers this more than offsets the tax
benefits of the pension plan.
While advisers can recommend with some confidence that older employees
should not join the scheme if they expect to retire within the next few years, they
point out that it is impossible to advise younger lower earners with any degree of
confidence. If the government changes the pension credit – as it is expected to do
– younger workers who have been advised not to join a company scheme could
be seriously disadvantaged, as they will have lost the opportunity to build up
private funds. There is also the prospect that a low earner becomes a higher
earner later in life and thus has missed out on a potentially valuable early start to
pension saving, irrespective of any change in the pension credit.
Employers, therefore, are concerned that there may be a backlash if employees
lose out on means tested benefits in retirement. There might also be a
trustee/employer legal issue where the DC is trust based (i.e., an occupational
money purchase scheme). For their part, advisers see lower earners as a very
high-risk area for their business. 
“The issues for lower earners are complicated and the rewards are not worthwhile. It is
actually cheaper to advise an employee on £30,000 than it is to advise an employee on
£12,000.We are very quick to identify employees in the danger zone.” IFA
“We need to know if and when the pensions tax credit will end in order to advise those
on lower and average earnings.Without this the government is sewing the seeds for
another major pensions scandal – this time entirely of its own making, although of course
it will be the advisers in the dock, not the DWP.” EBC
“A large number of employees are being disenfranchised for all the wrong reasons.Many
of these people are keen to save for retirement and yet we have to tell them not to bother
with the company pension scheme.” EBC
“Means testing is a barrier for the adviser and for the employer.Both have to blur what
was hitherto a clear message about a great opportunity to save for retirement that
includes an employer contribution.” EBC
“To communicate a scheme effectively we need to present a clear message.We need to be
able to say that where the employer offers a contribution matching arrangement then it is
almost certainly a good idea to join.The fact that we have to make exceptions to this
argument muddies the water and introduces confusion and suspicion.” EBC
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2.3 Companies with fewer than 100 employees are at risk of exclusion
Each IFA and EBC draws up a profile of its target client based on the
organisation’s business model and the number of trained advisers it can deploy.
The smallest workforce likely to be targeted – assuming average earnings – has
about 50 employees. Below this level it is not cost effective unless the company has
comparatively highly paid staff – as is the case in the technology sector, for
example. The largest corporate clients taken on by the IFAs and EBCs we
interviewed had about 1000 employees, although this is the exception rather than
the rule. The 100 – 250 employee workforce is more typical.
The number of employees is only part of the screening process. Employers with a
high proportion of lower earners are unlikely to find an adviser willing to sell them
a pension scheme. 
“A company with less than 100 staff and with a high proportion of lower earners is a
huge risk.We don’t go there, even if some employees would definitely benefit from a
scheme.” IFA
“The risks of getting it wrong are too high. If we assume today’s legislation on means
testing stays in place then we should be advising many employees not to join. If a
company has less than 100 staff and a low-to-average earnings profile we regard it as
high-risk no-go territory.” IFA
This trend towards exclusion is exacerbated by the fact that providers are also
withdrawing from the smaller company market. Life offices lined up eagerly to
offer their stakeholder products in April 200114, but the prolonged bear market
and the increasing levels of consumer scepticism and distrust have dashed
providers’ hopes of finding a lucrative new market.
“As a leading provider in the mass market we went in to the stakeholder market with a
product that would accept as few as five employees.This year we raised that to a
minimum to 50 employees, irrespective of their earnings.We have not officially
withdrawn [from providing] for smaller schemes because that would be a difficult move to
justify in terms of our image, but in practice we simply ensure we are not competitive
below this level.” P
“The major cost for providers is scheme-specific.Given the cost of installation is virtually
the same for all companies it doesn’t make good business sense for us to focus on smaller
employers.The return on our investment is low and where there isn’t a dedicated
pensions manager the administration can be more complicated because whoever is dealing
with the pension scheme has other jobs to do and cannot give it the time it needs.” P
The result of these two trends is to exclude many employees from company
pension provision. This extends well beyond those who might do better under the
state means-testing system because advisers and providers operate ‘no-go’ areas
where they anticipate potential problems. We estimate that between 4.5m and 7m
people, corresponding to 16% - 25% of the working population, are excluded due
to this uncertainty and other disincentives to sell in the low premium market.15
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The problem of the disenfranchised extends to the retail market where most
advisers now target what they call the ‘high net worth’ client. We came across the
following candid comment from a financial planner in a pensions trade
publication:
“It is not my responsibility to spend my time with people who neither value the benefits
of financial planning nor have any intention of paying a commercially realistic fee […].
I don’t do poor people and I separate my charitable activities from my business practices
[…].” 16
Comment
2A. Clear reasons for lack of participation in smaller companies
The combination of these two factors – fear of mis-selling with reference to means
testing, and the disincentive to sell to small employers – certainly goes a long way
towards explaining the low levels of private pension provision among small
companies. When considered in conjunction with the fact that many SME finance
directors do not agree that pensions represent a good return on company
investment this provides further explanation for the empty stakeholder boxes.
We suspect that the government has been shielded from appreciating the extent 
of disenfranchisement because the insurance companies that traditionally have
provided products in the retail and small company market are unlikely to admit
that they operate a covert exclusion policy, since this would harm their reputation. 
At the risk of stating the obvious, in a free market economy there is no point in
hoping that private pensions will be made available to lower earners and to
employers with small workforces when in practice providers and advisers regard
these as high risk, no-go areas on the grounds of poor profit potential and
possible future mis-selling liabilities.
The government should take a close look at the cost of provision for smaller
employers and consider whether it should provide more financial support for
multi-employer initiatives such as the Building and Civil Engineers (B&CE) Benefits
Scheme, the Pensions Trust (which provides a range of schemes for the charitable,
voluntary, educational and social services sector), and the new scheme to be
launched by the NAPF.
Rather than raise the stakeholder annual management charge cap further, we
suspect that there are still too many small and inefficient insurance companies in
the UK and that, however brutal, further competition that forces economies of
scale, mergers and takeovers, is a better way forward than for the government to
allow providers to increase their charges. 
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2B. The government must clarify the employee’s position on means-tested
benefits
With regards to means testing, we do not consider the wider political and social
issues here but instead focus on the barriers to participation. If the government
wants advisers, providers, and employers to help it meet its target of extending
private pension coverage to 60% by 2050 (currently 40%) the DWP must clarify the
position of lower earners and means tested benefits vs. private pension savings.
Otherwise it becomes necessary to advise members on an individual basis on the
means testing issue – or, what is more likely, ignore those that fall into the danger
zone altogether. 
The government estimates that 2.8m individuals who earn over £10,000 have
access to a company-based scheme but have not joined.17 This does not surprise
us. Indeed we feel that the government is being naïve if is believes that £10,000 is
the threshold at which private provision becomes attractive to the individual and
that IFAs and providers will serve this market. Any consideration of compulsion or
quasi-compulsion in the form of automatic enrolment, active decisions, and anti-
discrimination rules, would miss the point entirely if it does not take full account of
means testing and the confusion and uncertainty that surrounds it.
The government should also note that advisers currently recommend contracting
in to the state second pension (S2P) across the board. According to Hewitt Bacon &
Woodrow overall only 22% of DC schemes remain contracted out as a result of the
trend for newer schemes to be established on a contracted-in basis. They note that
this  “…follows falls in the levels of rebates and the employers’ desire to keep their
sponsored arrangements away from the complexity of the state system.”18 Under
the Labour government the government actuary has calculated the rebate of
national insurance contributions on an actuarially equivalent basis and has
stripped out the margins that previously were added to make the decision
financially attractive.
In addition, advisers are concerned that they might be accused of recommending
contracting out when the individual discovers later that the value of benefits built
up via the rebates is less than the state pension forgone. This, plus the complexity
of the state benefits system, makes contracting out for low earners yet another no-
go area.
2C.Employees need information on pension contributions vs. debt repayment
The government might also consider providing information on debt repayment vs.
pension contributions. This is particularly relevant given the current high levels of
(both short- and long-term) debt at all ages and across all socio economic groups.
Several providers and advisers pointed out that it is far easier for a lower earner to
take out an unaffordable loan of £20,000 than it is to invest £20 per month in a
stakeholder scheme. It is a very good point and one we hope that the government
and regulators will take on board.
In this context it is important that the government considers how its advice to
young people to begin saving as soon as possible for retirement conflicts with its
desire to raise to 50% the number of young people who enter tertiary education.
These young people emerge typically with £12,000 - £15,000 debt after a three-
year course.19 In an environment of low and volatile investment returns, the cost of
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servicing this debt may make this a more appropriate immediate priority – in
which case the government, employers and advisers might accept that younger
employees with student debt should not join a scheme until this is cleared. 
Rather than forego the employer contribution this could be directed towards the
student loan via the same PAYE system that deducts regular repayments from the
ex-student’s salary once he or she earns £15,000pa. Once the debt is cleared
there could be an automatic switching mechanism so that the same amount
automatically is contributed to the pension fund unless the person opts out. This is
a similar concept to Save More Tomorrow TM, which directs pay rises into the
pension fund. Both harvest money for the pension plan that the individual is used
to managing without.
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Section 3. The first ‘DC-boomer’ generation will hit retirement
in 3-6 years; we do not have systems to cope
3.1 DC with the open market option misses the point
It makes no sense to promote DC without ensuring that each individual has access
to the most suitable annuity at retirement, both in terms of rate and design.
Despite the growing flexibility over the way retirement income is drawn from a DC
arrangement we believe that annuitisation will remain the most appropriate
vehicle for the majority. The retirement income, therefore, will depend partly on
the fund size and partly on the annuity rate, which represents the conversion rate,
pound for pound, between capital accrued and annual income purchased.
To ensure employees make the right choices at retirement the minimum
requirement ought to be access to the open market option and information about
enhanced and impaired life annuities. These points are valid for all fund sizes. 
“It is essential that employees get the best possible rate for their annuity.Rates for
standard annuities vary by at least 30% between the top providers and the less
competitive companies.On top of this, employees with health or lifestyle conditions can
get an additional 18% for a smoker’s annuity [a type of enhanced annuity],while an
additional 20-30% and more is available from impaired life annuities. If the company
pension provider doesn’t offer these types of annuity then employees will miss out
again.” IFA
Where the employer is prepared to pay a fee, advisers can offer individual
retirement income sessions. 
“The employers pay us by fees and so at six months before retirement we see the
individual employee and take them through their options.Where an annuity is
appropriate we use the open market option and can secure the best contract.This would
be on nil-commission terms.” EBC
For commission-based advisers meeting the employees’ needs is more difficult. 
At present few schemes in the SME market have considered implementing a
formal at-retirement service to members and subcontracting this to an annuity
specialist who will work on a commission basis. For smaller funds an internet
service offered on a limited menu execution-only basis is likely to be the only
economic option. 
“If you offer an online service to scheme members it is inevitable that there will be a lot
of unprofitable quotations, either because the member is taking a look at what’s available
but does not plan to buy at that point in time, or because the fund size is so small it’s
impossible to make any profit from the process.” IFA
Where scheme membership includes higher than average earners, individuals
with large funds will need advice on the more sophisticated annuities (investment-
linked, flexible) and on phased retirement/drawdown. This point also applies to
employees who have built up a reasonable retirement income in a DB scheme and
have been in a DC scheme for the last few years before retirement. 
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“Some employees need access to investment-linked annuities.Where employees were
members of a final salary scheme for many years and only joined the DC scheme in the
last few years before retirement they may use these DC funds as a top-up, like an
additional voluntary contribution [AVC] scheme and want to take more of an
investment risk with the fund.” IFA
What is clear from our research is that while there is some overlap, the top annuity
providers in the conventional and specialist annuity market are not the same life
offices as the SME pension providers. In some cases the pension provider is not
competitive at all for annuities.
“The top annuity providers are Prudential, Legal & General,Canada Life, and
Norwich Union.Also competitive for certain annuitants are Friends Provident,Clerical
Medical, and Scottish Widows.Beyond these companies we would only go elsewhere if it
was necessary to do full underwriting – for example for an impaired life annuity.”
Comment
3A. “DC boomers” will be forced to buy second-rate annuities 
The first “DC boomer” generation will start to hit retirement between 2007 and
2010. This group includes employees in their 50s who were persuaded or required
to switch from the company DB scheme into the new DC scheme. DB to DC
conversions for future accrual have been taking place since 1990. Towards the end
of that decade the trend accelerated with the introduction of the accounting rule
FRS17, which revealed a deficit in most DB schemes and which provided a rationale
for companies to close their DB schemes and introduce a new DC alternative. 
The majority of DC-boomers are those currently in their mid- to late-40s. These
are the employees who took out one of the new personal pensions in their late 20s
and early 30s when these plans were introduced in 1988 (although contributions
could be backdated to 1987). At the time a huge government campaign
encouraged employees to opt out of Serps and to invest the rebate of NICs in a
personal pension. In 15 years’ time, this generation will hit retirement and the
demand for open market option advice will increase significantly.
In the light of these facts we believe practitioners and employers should address
the delivery of the open market option to all employees with DC funds urgently.
3B. Cost-effective ways to deliver the open market option  
Without access to an online service those with comparatively small funds (less than
£50,000) will find it very difficult to exercise the open market option and may be
limited to the annuities offered by the pension provider. Even where the fund is
large enough to make the OMO worthwhile we believe that in practice most will
accept their provider’s annuity in the same way that they accepted the default
investment fund. According to the Association of British Insurers, two-thirds of
people in contract DC schemes and with individual plans do not use the OMO.
This means that the 25% improvement that can be achieved by using the open
market option in effect will be denied to a very large number of employees, while
those with a health condition or relevant lifestyle feature would miss out on even
more beneficial enhanced and impaired rates.
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Under pension tax simplification, which comes into force in April 2006, the de
minimis fund size below which it is not necessary to buy an annuity is £15,000 
(i.e. 1% of the lifetime allowance of £1.5m, which is the total fund that can be 
built up in the tax-favoured pension environment under pension tax simplification).
Assuming the individual will take the 25% tax-free cash, this rule applies to those
with a fund size of £20,000. We believe that from April 2006 all individuals with 
a fund of £20,000 or more need access to the OMO.
There are two options here:
• The Financial Services Authority could require providers in the SME stakeholder 
and GPP market to offer an OMO. At present they have to alert pension clients 
to the fact that the OMO is available but this may be obscured in the pack of 
information providers send out typically four months and again six weeks before
the individual’s selected retirement date. 
• A better approach would be for the employer and insurer to delegate this 
responsibility to an annuity specialist. This is the model adopted by the 
J Sainsbury stakeholder scheme, which uses the Hargreaves Lansdown annuity 
facility. Other specialist annuity advisers can offer this service. 
Annuity specialists say that to be cost-effective, services that offer the OMO to
small funds must be execution-only, using a series of questions to ensure the
quotation takes account of the fund size, the individual’s age and state of health
for example, but not other sources of income and savings. This limited service
does expose the pension policyholder to certain risks but on balance it is far better
than the current system where most policyholders automatically accept their
provider’s annuity.
3C. Wealth warnings required for annuity purchase deferment 
In the light of the government’s relaxation of annuity purchasing rules and its
plans to make it possible to work past retirement age, individuals need to consider
their options carefully. With DC it is not at all certain that deferring the annuity
purchase and paying contributions for additional years will improve the fund size
and will automatically ensure the individual is eligible for a better annuity rate.
This is because markets can fall, interest rates and hence annuity rates can fall,
and longevity is continually increasing. In contrast, an extra year of work in a DB
scheme will lead to an increase in pension (so long as the sponsoring employer
remains in business). 
According to figures from Annuity Direct, an individual with a DC pension fund
who delayed buying an annuity would have almost certainly lost out at any time
over the period from 1998 onwards. The individual would have needed to achieve
returns of between 6% and 9.5% to break even with the level of the earlier annuity
rate and the income that would have been paid over the years of deferment.
DC, in conjunction with the government and EU anti-age discrimination
legislation, confers the power on the individual employee to decide when to retire.
In theory in future we can expect employees to select their retirement date
according to when they can afford to retire. If they need to work longer – as will be
the case for many – then we must ensure that they understand the risks of delaying
the annuity purchase and of making further contributions that may not achieve the
expected returns if markets are falling.
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Section 4. The commission system creates bias in the scheme
choice and design
4.1 Commission-based sales dominate the SME market 
The growth of DC has had a marked impact on employee benefits consultants’
business models, blurring the boundaries between these firms and the corporate
IFAs. Probably least affected in the short term are the top three EBCs, Mercer
Human Resources, Watson Wyatt, and Hewitt Bacon and Woodrow. These
organisations actively target FTSE 100 companies, large public sector schemes
and international corporations. Generally they do not target smaller companies,
although they may have a significant number of smaller schemes on their books
as a result of previous acquisitions of rival EBCs. 
Any attempt to distinguish between consultants is somewhat arbitrary but we
identify the next category as those firms that target the FTSE 100 but also operate
in the mid-cap market and will consider smaller companies, both private and
quoted, if the proposition is sufficiently attractive. This group includes Aon
Consulting, Hymans Robertson, Lane Clark & Peacock, and Towers Perrin. In our
interviews we noticed a considerable overlap between this group and the main
players in the SME.  
Medium sized and smaller consultants, and larger firms of accountants that have
a comparatively small pensions department tend to operate solely in the sub-FTSE
350 markets, where they compete with the corporate IFAs. 
Ten years ago, the competition between corporate IFAs and consultants in the SME
market was far less marked. Today the market is fairly equally divided and the
cultural differences between these two types of organisation are rapidly eroding.
Several corporate IFAs are stepping back from the traditional one-to-one advisory
model that characterises these organisations, while EBCs recognise the need to
make a more transparent sales pitch than has been traditional. The EBCs still
operate on a fee basis but in most cases will offset commission against their bill. 
“We quote on a fee basis but in some cases we are prepared to take part of our
remuneration as commission.Typically this would be for the first year,when we can take
advantage of the high rates of commission providers are prepared to pay.” EBC
“We negotiate tough deals.Even allowing for a commission payment we can secure
annual management charges of 0.7% to 0.8%.However this is not the case for smaller
IFAs,which don’t have the same economies of scale and collective bargaining power. For
these companies the AMC would be at least 1%.” IFA
“We quote a fee but we don’t mind offsetting commission.Also,we are prepared to
operate on a risk share basis – in other words if the take-up is less than expected we may
not get paid for all of our work.” EBC
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4.2 Regulation and individual advice
Regulation is an important issue. Most EBCs traditionally were regulated solely by
the Institute of Actuaries and therefore were not permitted to offer financial advice
on a one-to-one basis (the consultants with an accountancy background generally
are FSA authorised). The EBCs have taken one of three steps in order to operate in
the DC market and to provide one-to-one advice where required, although in
many cases this would be limited to the executives and directors. 
• To operate solely under FSA authorisation.
• To set up a separate FSA-authorised unit.
• To adopt dual authorisation for the entire firm. 
Corporate IFAs have a strong sales culture and a long track record in the DC
market. Several offer a full DB service as well. 
Regulation is relevant in the context of individual advice. FSA-authorised firms do
not necessarily offer individual advice to all employees in their schemes and this
appears to be a controversial issue. Those that do not offer one-to-one advice
argue that for group business this is unaffordable and cast doubts on the ability of
any adviser to offer this facility in practice to a large number of employees.
“We implement lots of new schemes but we don’t go near the members.There is not
enough commission to cover our costs within stakeholder pricing.” IFA
“Our client is the employer.We only deal directly with the individuals who are on the
board or are key senior executives.” EBC
Others say that one-to-one sessions are essential to achieve a high take up rate
and present this as a central feature of their service.
“In a greenfield site it may be enough to use negative affirmation [where the individual
is automatically enrolled but can opt out] or group presentations,where individuals have
pre-populated forms that just require a few ticks and a signature.However, in our
experience one-to-one is the most effective way to implement a scheme, particularly
where this involves a change.” IFA
“One-to-one counselling is not just about getting the employee to sign up – it also helps
raise the average employee contribution by 25% to 50%.”IFA
We have no reason to doubt the advisers who say they offer one-to-one
counselling. We have spoken directly to the pensions decision makers in a range
of smaller companies and their reports of the one-to-one communications process
support the advisers’ claims. Indeed what distinguishes the larger advisers in this
market is the communications facility that can offer individual advice for schemes
with up to 1000 and, in one case, 2000 members. 
It is important not to confuse individual generic advice with regulated advice. In
practice these are very different services – an issue we examine in Section 8. In
practice what most firms offer is the opportunity for individuals to ask questions,
whether this is arranged for the entire workforce or is offered to those who want it
after the initial group presentation and in regular “surgeries”, typically twice or
four times a year. While advisers are very careful to distinguish between regulated
and generic unregulated advice, our research indicates that employees are
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unaware of the difference and see all such exchanges as specific. To put it bluntly,
employees are unlikely to give much if any thought to regulatory distinctions.
Most of the advisers would expect to offer individual counselling to the senior
executives, for obvious reasons, and this would be fully regulated advice. 
There are several other relevant differences in business models among advisers.
For example the fee-based organisations that do not accept commissions say that
they have a clear financial commitment from the employer before they go in.
However, paying a fee for advice does not necessarily mean that the employer is
looking for a high participation rate.
Some advisers go for greenfield sites – smaller start-ups for example – but most
seek to identify employers with an existing arrangement that they can review and
follow up with recommend improvements and cost savings. 
“Our business model is to grow through acquisition of new clients that have a benefits
package but are not happy with the cost, its effectiveness, and the services of the provider.
In these cases we are looking to improve the package.We find that employers are willing
to listen because they have already made a commitment to pensions as an employee
benefit.We avoid start-up businesses as these represent a very long-term return.” IFA
Both types of adviser would expect to find opportunities to introduce other
workplace benefits, such as life assurance, income protection insurance, critical
illness insurance, and private medical insurance. In terms of commission these
products can be very lucrative, as they are not bound by the stakeholder annual
management charge cap.
Smaller advisers to SMEs are critical of the approach adopted by the major
consultants when they install a stakeholder scheme for a large company.
“The big consultants are not geared up to provide ongoing advice on stakeholders or
group personal pensions.They tend to do the initial presentations and that’s it.” IFA
“With the larger consultants and DC it’s fire and forget.Once it’s established the
scheme is left to the insurance company to run.We believe employers that sponsor these
schemes should have annual reviews of providers.We take a hands-on approach to
monitoring schemes to check administration and investment.” IFA
4.3 Pension design for SMEs
Employers rely on their advisers for the design and delivery of their DC scheme.
There is no doubt that the smaller benefits consultants and corporate IFAs that
serve the SME market are strongly biased towards commission-paying, contract-
based group personal pensions (GPPs) and stakeholder schemes. Although some
firms can and do advise on occupational money purchase and on DB, their
preference is for DC. The main proposition for these firms is conversion services
for old-style DC contracts20 to modern DC contracts, and from DB to DC; DB wind-
up services; and investment solutions for schemes in deficit that cannot proceed to
wind up until they have improved their funding levels. 
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A minority of the larger EBCs said they would be more likely to advise on a switch
from final salary DB to a “contracted in money purchase” (CIMP) scheme where
the employer wished to retain the paternalistic element of control and the role of
the trustee.
“Switching to a CIMP can be quite straightforward as we can graft this on to the
existing trust deed and other infrastructure.Where the employer is used to DB, the
company will have in place trustees and be used to working with actuaries,
administrators, auditors, solicitors and pension scheme accountants.” EBC
“Larger employers might still prefer a trust-based occupational DC scheme for reasons of
control and to enable the trustees to select the investment choice.” EBC
Overall, however, the number of employers wishing to retain a trust-based scheme
is limited and dwindling. Those with an existing trust-based DB scheme generally
want to shed the risk and responsibility.
“Ten years ago even those without the DB infrastructure would have wanted their own
trust-based scheme.Now they don’t want the burden and see the advantages of a
contract-based stakeholder scheme or GPP.” EBC
None of the advisers we interviewed offers ‘risk-sharing’ schemes such as career
average or cash balance.21 This is for a variety of reasons:
Advisers believe that where an employer wants to close a final salary scheme,
there is little attraction in a different type of DB scheme. 
Career average and cash balance introduce two complex issues that are absent in
contract-based DC: the need for actuarial advice, and the element of discretion.
“I like the concept of career average and cash balance in theory but in practice our clients
just wouldn’t be interested.They want zero employer risk.” EBC
“We see cash balance and career average as a way for the major consultants to keep open
the jobs for the actuaries.They are far too complicated.” IFA
In many cases an employer will operate several existing schemes – for example a
traditional final salary DB scheme, a DC additional voluntary contribution (AVC)
scheme, and an uncompetitive occupational DC scheme introduced in the late
1980s or early 1990s.22 Multiple schemes are a very common feature where the
company has been involved in merger and acquisition activity. The overriding
objective for most employers in these circumstances is to sweep away the
complexity and introduce a simple single option. Contract-based DC fits this
agenda well.
The Pension Protection Fund (PPF) is expected to apply to all DB schemes including
cash balance and career average structures, and this would act as a cost
deterrent. The PPF’s early estimate of the average cost to a scheme is about 2% of
total contributions.23 On a 5% contribution matching scheme that would represent
an increase of 40% in terms of payroll costs.
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Where the adviser is remunerated via commission, achieving a high take-up rate
is essential. DC is much easier to communicate than DB and so is a better vehicle
for achieving this.
“With DC we can explain to employees that this is just a glorified bank account with
special tax breaks.The lack of understanding about pensions is so widespread that we
have to keep the message really simple or employees won’t join.” IFA
“Good communications might achieve high participation rates for career average and cash
balance but this would be in spite of rather than because of the scheme design.” IFA
“A well known supermarket that offers a career average scheme based on 1.5% of salary
per annum [equivalent to a ‘sixtieths’ scheme] found that one of the reasons staff left to
join a rival supermarket was because the rival offered a 5% contribution into a contract
DC scheme,which they perceived as a much better deal.” P
4.4 Stakeholder vs.GPP
All of the advisers we spoke to had a strong preference for either stakeholder or
GPP and it took us some time to discover why this would be the case. At face value
it is difficult to understand why a GPP would be preferred over a stakeholder, as
the fund choice does not vary significantly for the type of contracts offered to SMEs
and the providers broadly speaking are the same for both products. Moreover, as
a regulated product, stakeholder schemes offer the employer protection against
future employee or employer dissatisfaction. With regard to the employer’s liability
position relating to stakeholder schemes, the Welfare Reform & Pensions Act
1999, section 3(8) states that employers do not have to “investigate or monitor, or
make any judgment as to, the past, present or future performance of the
scheme”.24
The EBCs generally favoured stakeholder.
“We cannot understand why an adviser would recommend a GPP over a stakeholder,
assuming the employer is willing to make a minimum contribution of 3%.Employers
can be sure that a stakeholder offers fair charges, terms and accepts small monthly
contributions.GPPs are not really any more flexible.” EBC
“Stakeholders have the considerable attraction of being able to take in transfers from
older DC schemes or DB schemes without the requirement that the individual receives
regulated advice.” EBC
“Stakeholders represent all round good value.We would typically use a nil commission
scheme, as it offers great terms for the scheme members, albeit lousy terms for the
provider’s shareholders.Asset managers are generally more expensive and most don’t do
stakeholders.” EBC
IFAs state that apart from liking the greater flexibility of the GPP, employers are not
attracted to the stakeholder due to its poor image.
“Employers tell us they don’t like the sound of stakeholder as they associate it with
‘cheap’.” IFA
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However, another reason could be the higher remuneration it is possible for
advisers to negotiate on GPP contracts. A stakeholder scheme provider can only
make one charge – the annual management charge (AMC), which is capped at
1%, rising to 1.5% in 2005 (for the first 10 years of the contract’s existence and
then back to 1% pa). Fee based advisers and providers suggest that with a GPP
insurance companies are able to increase the adviser’s remuneration by making
an additional payment, which they describe as a “marketing budget”. Although
our sources were very reliable, we cannot substantiate this point. Even in the most
candid interviews with commission-based advisers and commission-paying
providers this additional payment was never mentioned. 
4.5 Actuarial expertise remains essential 
Despite their strong bias towards contract DC schemes, advisers in the SME
market will encounter a range of issues that require actuarial expertise. Many
firms, including at least two corporate IFAs, have such expertise in-house but those
that do not have to buy in the services of a third party where necessary. Several
firms of actuaries now specialise in these third-party arrangements.
Actuarial services, therefore, remain a core function. Even where the employer
decides to prevent the growth of DB liabilities by closing the scheme to all future
accrual, the scheme is unlikely to be sufficiently well funded to afford to wind up
on the full buy-out basis required since June 2003.25 This means that in addition to
introducing the new DC scheme, the employer would expect the adviser to
manage the closed DB scheme and to advise on a suitable investment strategy.
This is a highly complex area and requires scheme-specific asset allocation and
investment strategies to manage the shorter-term cash flow requirements to pay
benefits, while simultaneously using part of the assets to secure longer-term
growth. The adviser would need to work with the trustees of the DB scheme to help
maintain an appropriate employer contribution rate. Where the trustees include
the finance director, as is common in smaller schemes, there can be conflicts of
interest that require skill to manage.
In addition, the members will require advice on what best to do with their accrued
benefits in the closed DB scheme. This is a potentially fraught area for advisers, as
the firm’s client is the employer, not the employee. It may be tempting for the
adviser, with the support of the employer, to encourage employees to take a
transfer from the DB scheme to the new DC arrangement. Such transfers may not
be in the employees’ best interests. Nevertheless there is a strong incentive to
encourage these transfers, as this will reduce the employer’s long-term liabilities
and significantly increase the adviser’s commission. 
“If we wanted to,we would find it very easy to promote transfers.Most employees
assume that they will transfer automatically when they hear the DB scheme is being
closed. It comes as a surprise to them to find they have the option of leaving their benefits
in the closed scheme and that this might be in their best interests.” IFA
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Comment
4A. Dual regulation is complex and an administrative burden
The financial services regulators need to keep pace with market developments 
and move towards a single regulatory system for all types of pensions advice. 
In the past, there was a much more obvious divide between the retail and small
company pensions market, which was predominantly DC (with a minority of DB
schemes invested in insurance pooled funds), and the institutional market, which
was DB. According to the EBCs, advisers ‘sold’ DC, while consultants ‘advised’ on
DB, leaving the choice to the client, and in particular to the trustee. The advisory
model is still relevant in the FTSE 100 market, and to a lesser extent for FTSE Mid-
250 companies but it is not common among SMEs. 
4B. The commission system encourages participation in difficult markets
Clearly, commission payments must be reasonable in the context of a low return
economic environment. They must also be transparent. The EBC charging
structure, which sets out a fee and then deducts commission, may be more
transparent than the structure used by the IFA.
Despite these observations, we feel it is time that advisers and consultants
accepted that in the corporate market – and particularly the SME market –
regulated advice is synonymous with regulated selling. The purely commission-
based firms are the sole operators in the toughest sectors where coverage is poor.
Without these IFAs the extent of disenfranchisement would be even greater than it
is at present. If the government or certain sectors within the pensions industry find
the commission basis for sales unpalatable they must come up with alternative
ways to reach employers that are not fully committed to private pensions.
Having said that we are concerned that there are no “rules of engagement” for
commissions and other forms of adviser remuneration paid on non-stakeholder
contracts. This is potentially detrimental to the market as a whole and prevents
providers that have a brand commitment to offering value for money from
participating in certain sections of the market. We understand the FSA is
considering this issue.
4.C Transfers 
We were also very concerned to discover how readily employees assume they must
take a transfer of benefits out of a DB scheme that is closed to future accrual and
into the new DC scheme. In our research we came across cases where 100% of
employees had transferred DB cash values to the DC scheme. This is a complex
issue, however. In theory we find it hard to accept that it could be in the interests of
the entire workforce to transfer but in practice, given the current concerns over
employer solvency and underfunded schemes, there could be a case for this
practice for smaller employers where attractive transfer values are offered. If so
the rationale for transfers from an employer’s closed DB scheme to the new DC
arrangement needs to be clarified – particularly given that the adviser’s contract is
with the employer. 
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4D. Shared risk schemes
While shared-risk schemes such as career average do not appear to be offered on
a single-employer basis in the SME market, this structure is sometimes argued as
feasible for multi-employer schemes, where the economies of scale make the
additional complexity affordable. Unlike in the Netherlands, here in the UK, with a
few notable exceptions, we do not have a culture of industry-wide schemes and so
it is difficult to judge this matter. 
The NAPF has devoted a great deal of time to studying the best model for a multi-
employer scheme for smaller companies and is likely to favour a low level career
average revalued earnings scheme with a discretionary DC top-up. This is similar
to the structure used by larger companies in the US, where employees are offered
a very basic level of benefit via a risk share scheme but also access to the 401(k)
(company-sponsored DC) scheme as a top up. However, in the US, the smaller
companies generally opt for pure DC for the same reasons as here in the UK. In
the Netherlands, there is a trend away from DB and towards DC due to similar
funding problems to those we have experienced in the UK.26
We would urge the NAPF to ensure there is an adequate funding allocation to
communications for its multi-employer scheme, as this will be a difficult structure
for employers and employees to understand. Some of the multi-employer schemes
in the UK’s voluntary sector and in the building industry that have the employers’
support do not have a particularly good record on securing adequate employee
contributions and we suspect that communications is an issue here. 
While it is understandable to want to direct as much as possible into the individual
employee’s pot, an under-communicated scheme will not achieve its objectives in
terms of take-up. So there remains a critical trade off between communication
costs and net contributions invested.  Moreover employees will not understand the
scheme and will not appreciate the value of the employer’s investment. 
We also wonder how many smaller employers in practice will want to take on the
DB legislative burdens, including the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) and the new
Pensions Regulator. 
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Section 5. Insurers pay “crippling” rates of commission to buy
market share
5.1 Fierce battle among providers for top-five status
About seven of the 35 stakeholder providers whose schemes are open to new
business are genuinely active in the SME market on a national scale. These are all
insurance companies. They provide the administration and, importantly, the
default investment fund.
The line-up is as follows:  
Axa 
Friends Provident
Norwich Union 
Scottish Equitable 
Scottish Life 
Scottish Widows 
Standard Life 
Clerical Medical is expected to re-enter the commission-paying stakeholder
market after withdrawing in 2001 due to new business strains. HSBC is a strong
player in the SME market but sells purely to its corporate banking clients. 
Cooperative Insurance Society (CIS), Winterthur and Zurich cropped up as
preferred providers for one of the fee-based EBCs.  These companies subcontract
the asset management. 
Two big names are missing from this list, namely Legal & General and Prudential.
While these companies were well thought of, advisers say that these providers tend
to prefer to deal directly with the employer and the employees rather than operate
through an intermediary. Commission is an important issue here. Prudential
confirmed that it does not pay commission on its group plans. L&G does pay
commission (although advisers said otherwise) but does not offer the high rates
available from the companies listed above. 
L&G and Prudential are used in winding-up cases where it is necessary for the
scheme to buy out liabilities with immediate and deferred annuities.
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The providers listed are favoured by advisers because they meet the following
criteria, which firms say they assess on a strict formulaic basis and review
annually:
Scalability. Few providers offer the required level of services and are prepared to
make them available to SMEs.
Administration. This is the key to successful implementation. Insurers have a very
mixed record on this function, even where they have made a substantial
investment in their systems.
Streamlined joining facility. All providers now offer this process, which substitutes
a simple and short consent form for the lengthy application forms that previously
were thought essential. The employee signs a single A4 sheet, which the adviser
has pre-populated with details provided by the employer (age, date of birth,
national insurance number etc). Typically this form authorises the deduction of
contributions from payroll and for these to be directed into the default option,
except where the individual wishes to make a different choice. 
Communications literature and presentation material. However, many advisers
use their own booklets and material.
IT capability. Many employers want internet/intranet facilities so individual web
access is essential. However there are some who prefer a paper-based model, so
it is a question of matching the provider to the client. 
Financial strength and commitment to the market for the long term. 
Parentage. Advisers seek reassurance that the commitment of the provider is
matched by the commitment of its parent company.
Adviser remuneration (commission and “marketing budget”). This will bias the
choice of provider towards the medium-sized life offices, which traditionally have
distributed largely or solely through advisers, and which pay very high rates of
commission.
Contract charges. Less of a priority – these are fairly similar across the market.
Contract terms. Again a fairly homogenous market.
Fund choice and investment performance. Advisers expect the provider to run
the main default option and, where necessary, to offer open architecture to give
access to alternatives for more sophisticated members.
Marketing and educational support.
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Investment houses do not generally operate in the SME market. Only three
companies were mentioned as possible providers selected on rare occasions:
• Fidelity
• Invesco
• Newton
Of the three companies mentioned above only Invesco is a registered stakeholder
provider. Asset managers tend to pay commissions to advisers in the retail market
but operate on a fee basis for group business. They also tend to have a
comparatively high minimum monthly premium for GPPs. As a result these
companies tend to be used by the fee-based advisers and only then for the larger
clients. Generally these asset managers focus on the FTSE 350 as their main target
market. Where they offer in-house administration (Fidelity, Invesco) they are well
placed to deal directly with the employer rather than operate via an intermediary,
although the UK company pensions market is still very much an intermediary-
controlled market. 
The number of providers offering stakeholder and GPP schemes is likely to shrink.
“Experience suggests that a proportion of these companies will not ultimately be able to
compete in the new environment. It is believed that the entire company-sponsored
market may end up consisting of around 10-15 companies and a number of additional
“niche” providers.While any scheme we would establish would be arranged so that we
could change the provider at any time without penalty, clearly we will try to avoid having
to make unnecessary changes by attempting to ensure that the chosen provider is likely to
remain in the unfolding stakeholder pensions marketplace.” IFA
This is a conservative view of the expected consolidation in the market. The major
consultants and analysts suggest that ultimately there will be between five and
seven providers in the stakeholder/GPP market as a whole, not just in the SME
sector. The Treasury recognises this in its June 2004 report on stakeholder
schemes, where it discusses the impact of the charge cap on a company’s decision
to enter the market or not. “If fewer providers enter the market, those that do will
be able to establish larger shares of stakeholder sales; costs may therefore fall as
these firms benefit from economies of scale.”27
5.2 Commission levels are unsustainable. Further rationalisation and
economies of scale are required
Despite the 1% cap on the annual management charge that applies in the
stakeholder market and that is widely adopted for GPPs, providers agree that they
are paying “crippling and unsustainable” rates of commission to advisers in order
to win market share. Commission can be worth up to 35% of the total
employer/employee contributions paid during the first year. On these contracts
there would be no return (claw back) of commission if the business tails off in
future or switches to another provider.
“These rates are not sustainable for insurance companies in their present weakened
financial state.They will have to come down even if providers move to the new 1.5%
annual management charge cap that can be used from 2005.” IFA
         
“This is a very competitive market.All of the seven main providers are very hungry for
new business and have invested heavily in their products and services.These companies
have a business model that is predicated on being a top five provider. It’s going to be a
case of survival of the fittest.” EBC
Interestingly most fee-based EBCs are also very commission-conscious.
“If we offset commission against our fee then it is to the benefit of our client to opt for a
company that pays a high rate of commission.” EBC
Providers are well aware that the current commission rates are unsustainable.
“Commissions are bound to fall and this will make it increasingly uncompetitive to
extend pension provision to smaller companies.There will be a vacuum where no adviser
or provider will go.” P
“We’ve got to find a better match between immediate costs and immediate income.The
real world has caught up with us – we can’t keep on investing in business that will not
give us a return for 15 years.” P
“The government still thinks that insurance companies have lots of money and can
afford to run loss-leader business in the smaller company market and in larger companies
with predominantly lower earners.This might have been true in the run up to the
introduction to stakeholders but it is no longer possible for us to serve these customers.” P
Over the next two years providers say they will be reconsidering their target
market.
“The providers with a tough business model – like Prudential and Legal & General –
have had no qualms about abandoning smaller companies.Those providers with a
tradition of serving SMEs are now being forced to rethink their business model. It’s
unfortunate but we will certainly be following the lead of Prudential and L&G and we
expect our competitors to do likewise.” P
Comment
5A. Life offices must review their business models
At first we thought the suggestion that life offices were being pressed to pay such
uneconomic levels of commission against their better judgment looked like special
pleading on the part of the industry. In the US mutuals like Vanguard and Fidelity
make a profit on annual management charges of less than 0.5%. However, the US
pension giants have access to a market that is five times the size of that in the UK
and have spent huge sums on their IT and administration. These  economies of
scale and the extremely efficient use of technology are missing in the UK, which, in
the SME market in particular, is characterised by a comparatively large number of
smaller players and uneven administration. In the UK Fidelity only works in the
large cap market and does not pay commission to advisers on its group business.
In the US these companies often go direct to employers so there is no
intermediary. 
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Once again we would stress that we do not seek to criticise commission-based
remuneration per se. However, it is clear that the high rates of commission major
advisers can command in the SME market will further undermine the financial
strength of the insurance companies at what is already a critical time following the
expense of introducing uneconomic stakeholder schemes, problems in the with-
profits market, and the impact on reserves of the prolonged bear market of 2000-
2002. 
There can be no doubt that differential levels of commission have a direct impact
on provider selection. We must recognise two facts here, however. First, it makes
absolute sense for providers working within stakeholder pricing models to seek to
achieve a significant share of the market. Only with the economies of scale this
confers can they remain competitive in what would otherwise be an unprofitable
business. Second, advisers need a financial incentive to encourage high employee
participation. The view from the market is that the current charging structure does
not allow life offices to pay levels of commission that reflect the amount of work
undertaken by the advisers and so providers are believed to be holding out in the
hope that weaker providers will be forced to withdraw. This could prove to be a
Pyrrhic victory if the survivors are seriously weakened by the battle.
To provide further guidance on this point we would need to examine each
provider’s profit projections on new group business. Stakeholder providers in the
mass market are unlikely to break even for about 12 to15 years, due to the low
charging environment and the new business costs, including adviser
commission.28 However, some may have more robust profit projections if they can
secure schemes where the average earnings are high and therefore the premiums
are more substantial. In these cases it is possible for a provider to write thin
margin business without undermining its long-term profitability. 
Investment managers could play a much stronger role in the SME market but are
only used where either the consultant works on a fee basis or the manager has
agreed commission terms in order to work with specific advisers. In practice, asset
managers like Invesco and Fidelity, which have considerable experience in the DC
market, focus on larger companies and say that they do not currently seek
business from the advisers in the SME market. 
5B. Further rationalisation of the market expected
The expected rationalisation in the life office sector is in accordance with our
research on the DC models used in other countries. In particular the Australian
experience with its DC model, the Superannuation Guarantee, demonstrates that
a low-cost mass-market scheme can work but requires a small number of very
large providers to achieve the necessary economies of scale to drive down
charges. Changes in Australia included the dominance of the four largest banks,
which purchased fund management operations, followed by consolidation in the
middle insurance market, where numbers halved.
Sweden’s recent experience with the introduction of its compulsory Premium
Pension has demonstrated the inefficiencies of offering over 80 asset managers.
The system is being reassessed to discover the economically viable number of
asset managements that can operate in this market but in the meantime
institutions are pulling out voluntarily because they cannot make a profit in the low
AMC environment without sufficient volume business.29
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Section 6. Commission bias leads to unsatisfactory and
inappropriate investment default options
6.1 One-size fits all approach fails to meet employees’ needs
Investment default options are mandatory for the current stakeholder market
although the Department for Work and Pensions sets no guidelines for this feature.
Although the range of structures and asset allocations across the entire
stakeholder market is very varied,30 in practice, in the SME market advisers settle
for the managed unit-linked funds and, less frequently, index funds of the pension
provider. 
The form of the default option is crucial to the potential outcome because about
85% of members choose it and stay with it until retirement.31 Advisers do recognise
that the asset allocation of the fund is a major determinant of the outcome, yet
they also admit they are not particularly interested in the finer details of the default
fund provided it offers “average” returns over 3-5 years. 
The large managed unit linked funds offer near-passive investment – that is, they
follow the index very closely with minor deviations – and they follow peer group
allocations. An annual management charge of 1% (with the option to rise to 1.5%
in 2005) appears high for essentially passive investment management although
advisers can negotiate this down to 0.7% - 0.8%.32 We note, however, that rates
below 1% are only available to the larger advisers that generate volume for a
particular provider. 
“The annual management charge is a commercial issue and will depend on how much
the employer is prepared to pay.We can negotiate charges as low as 0.5% where the
employer pays us a fee.Where employers ask for a commission basis this will be higher –
at about 0.8% to 1%.Clearly then, under the commission structure, the employee bears
both the investment risk and the charges.” EBC
Providers assess each potential new scheme on its merits.
“We do not have a single charge for each provider’s default fund. It will depend on the
size of the case.When we are seeking quotes for a new client we send providers a detailed
account of the employee profile in terms of overall number, age profile, and earnings
range, among other factors.The provider will use this data to determine the AMC.” IFA
Benefits consultants in general preferred to use index-tracking funds for the default
option.
“The life office managed funds are so close to being passive that it is not worth paying
for active management and the associated risks.We almost always recommend lifestyled
passive funds as the default options.” EBC
“We tend to offer lifestyled trackers as the default option. If we receive a fee the annual
charge will be 0.5% - 0.6%. If the employer prefers us to receive a commission from the
provider this will increase the AMC to between 0.7% - 0.8%.” EBC
The overriding consensus among advisers is that employees will opt for the default
choice and will remain there until retirement.
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“Although we are asked to provide a choice of funds our presentation focuses on the
default option.” IFA
“Where we use streamlined enrolment the contributions are invested in the default
option.Members have the opportunity to change this but very few bother.” IFA
This means that the open architecture fund choice is used rarely. Often it is just the
executives and directors who take advantage of this facility. 
“It’s usually the FD who selects some more exciting external funds for the executives.
Most staff won’t bother with them.” IFA
6.2 Lifestyle widely used but under-researched
Lifestyling structures, which gradually switch the member into safer assets in the
run up to the expected retirement date, vary widely and there is no consensus over
the most effective design. Some manage the switch over 10 years, others over five
or three. Generally the switch is linked to the expected retirement date and does
not take account of market movements,33 nor does it cater for unexpected
retirements, which can leave people in the wrong asset classes just before the
annuity purchase. The absence of good quality research is a concern because
lifestyling will be mandatory under the “Sandler” stakeholder scheme, which will
be introduced in 2005. 
The major developments for lifestyle are among the large consultants selling into
the FTSE 350 market. Given the high fee basis it is unlikely that these will be made
available to SMEs. 
Advisers are pragmatic about lifestyle. They say that they recognise the flaws but if
it works for 90% of the members then that’s as good as it is likely to get.
“We struggle to get exited about lifestyle. Provided it starts to switch into safer assets five
years before the retirement date we feel there is no point in arguing about the semantics.”
IFA
“The objective is to reduce volatility in the final years.We know we can’t change the
overall volatility of the investment period but lifestyle makes the outcome more
predictable in the few years before annuity purchase.” EBC
For the majority of members advisers assume the objective will be to buy an
annuity at retirement. Where this is not the case they recognise that advice is vital
before any switching takes place.
“Five years before the expected retirement age it’s essential for members to think about
how they are likely to take their benefits as this will dictate the investment strategy.” EBC
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6A. Asset management strategies matter
We do not find the advisers’ attitude to asset management satisfactory but this is a
criticism of the SME pensions sector as a whole, which appears to pay lip service
rather than formally acknowledge the importance of asset allocation.34 Given that
the vast majority of members will passively accept whatever fund the employer or
adviser sets as the default, the variations in asset allocation, investment style,
quality of asset management, and lifestyling, present markedly different levels of
risk, as measured in the range of possible pension outcomes, for the members of
the scheme. 
We are convinced that it is possible for providers to improve their managed unit
linked funds in relation to group default options in the SME market. In September
2004 Scottish Life did just this when it introduced a much more sophisticated
strategy that matches the risk profile and investment objectives of the managed
portfolios (built from a range of core asset class funds) to the member’s objectives
and investment horizon. This followed the company’s research, which revealed
that in general managed funds suffered from poor performance benchmarks,
poor risk matching of the fund with the investor’s requirements, and poor
governance. These issues were also raised by the first Myners Review in 2001.35
Our research36 focused on the default options for stakeholder schemes but these
are very similar to the defaults offered by group personal pensions. Of the 35
stakeholders open to new members – 19 offer a “balanced managed” type fund.
This typically is invested in the range of 50%-60% in UK equities, 20%-30% in
overseas equities, 10%-20% in bonds, and up to 5% in cash. The majority of the
balanced managed funds are actively managed, but two use a passive approach.
A further 13 schemes offer an all-equity fund as default – seven of these are UK
only and five are invested globally. The global funds typically have a split of 70%
UK equities and 30% capitalisation-weighted overseas equities. All but one of the
equity-only funds uses passive management. The remaining three schemes offer a
“with-profits” type fund as the default, where the investment returns that are
credited to the member’s account undergo a degree of smoothing from year-to-
year. The with-profits funds are actively managed with an underlying asset
allocation on average of 50% UK equities, 10% overseas equities and 40% fixed
interest.
Lifestyle products switch from equities to a final pre-retirement allocation of 75%
government long bonds – to hedge the interest rate element of the annuity
purchase - and 25% cash to protect the portion of the fund likely to be taken as a
lump sum. The most common structure is to start switching from the equity or
balanced fund five years prior to retirement, moving progressively to a final year
allocation of 75% long bonds (i.e. with maturity greater than 15 years) and 25%
cash. A minority of stakeholder schemes use the same 75:25 final year allocation,
but begin switching either eight or ten years prior to retirement (two schemes,
respectively). 
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A number of schemes use alternative final-year asset allocations to the 75% bonds
– 25% cash approach. One scheme starts switching ten years prior to retirement
with a final allocation of 100% long bonds. The remaining two schemes offer
lifestyle profiles that have a final-year asset allocation of 100% cash, one of which
begins switching three years from retirement and the other which begins four
years from retirement.
It is apparent from these different designs that an individual joining a stakeholder
pension scheme and passively accepting the default investment arrangements can
get a substantially different asset allocation and lifestyle profile depending on
which provider the member or the employer/adviser, has chosen. 
At a very minimum we feel that the adviser needs to tailor the choice of scheme
default fund to the average assessed degree of risk tolerance of the employees. 
An established manufacturing company with a middle aged workforce is likely to
require, and feel comfortable with, something very different from a new start-up
technology firm with young, ambitious and well-paid employees. 
The tendency for advisers to use the providers’ managed funds suggests that they
regard these as a “safe bet”, whereas in practice the risk profile could be too
aggressive for some employees and overly cautious for others.
In conclusion, the range of strategic asset allocation profiles in default funds raises
questions about the selection processes being used by pension fund providers and
sponsors and about the due diligence being undertaken to ensure that the default
funds they choose are the most suitable for the majority of members. 
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Section 7. An employee contribution level above 4%-5% is a
barrier to participation
7.1 A wide gulf exists between experts’ recommendations and the amount
members are prepared to pay
The focus on the risks associated with asset allocation and lifestyle switching must
not deflect attention from the single overriding concern, which is that employees
will pay too little into their plans to achieve a realistic private retirement income.
Unfortunately, while policymakers recognise the need for higher contribution
levels, for many employees anything above 5% is a significant barrier to take-up.
Even 5% can be too high.
“The biggest barrier to wider participation is the entry price for the employee.We find
that even a contribution rate of between 4% and 6% is too much for most people.We
just have to accept this. In some cases where we start with this level, employers decide to
reduce it to encourage take-up.” IFA
“It’s very simple.The employee contribution rate must be achievable or the employee
won’t join.” IFA
Advisers aim at comparatively low joint contributions and often settle for even less.
For a stakeholder there is no requirement for an employer contribution but advisers
say they will not take on clients that contribute less than 3%. To provide a GPP
instead of a stakeholder, there must be a minimum employer contribution of 3%.
“We like to see an employer matching contribution of 5%, giving a total of 10%.This is
not because 10% is a magic number in producing the right retirement income but
because it is a nice round figure and employees seem to like this. Fractions are off-
putting.Where we have an employer contribution of 4.2% employees find this puzzling
and surprisingly this can act as a barrier.” IFA
“We will consider clients where they are prepared to pay a minimum contribution of
3%.Below this it is not economic for us to advise and we find it hard to gain the
employees’ attention.The first point we make in our presentation is to stress how much
easier it is to save for retirement if your employer is making a contribution to your
fund.” IFA
Non-contributory schemes are undervalued by the majority of employees and may
only work for very senior employees who are financially sophisticated. 
“The pension scheme is valued much more highly if the employee has to make a
contribution37. For the employer,matching works well as only those who are committed
to the company tend to join and so the employer only pays where there is the perception
of a reward in terms of employee loyalty.” EBC
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The employer contribution is a highly visible benefit and valued more by the
average member than the tax breaks.
“The incentives offered for investing in a pension scheme are linked to the income tax
system, so 40% taxpayers get 40% relief and everyone else gets 22% relief.There are
two problems here: nobody understands the incentive system and it is not focused on the
people the government most wants to save.” IFA
The employer contribution rate is strongly influenced by what is considered the
average for the industry rather than by what is necessary to provide attractive
pensions. 
“The first thing the MD or FD asks is ‘what is the going rate?’” EBC
“The objective for manufacturing, the building and civil engineering sectors, retailers and
leisure companies, for example, is that employers achieve a level playing field on rates of
pay and benefits. In these sectors the employer contribution,where paid,will be
comparatively low at about 3%. In knowledge-based sectors, like banking and
consulting,we see employer contributions of up to 15% and these are often offered on a
non-contributory basis, so the employees get the contribution whether or not they are
prepared to add to it themselves.” EBC
“In manufacturing the dominant factor is the hourly rate of pay, not the benefits.These
employees are not generally encouraged to think in terms of the value of the total benefits
package.” EBC
Comment
7A. Pressure on employees to make higher contributions could prove
counterproductive
According to the ACA survey on smaller companies the average combined
contribution (employee/employer) for group personal pensions (GPPs) is 8.6%.
For stakeholder schemes this figure is just 4.8%. “Employer contributions into
defined benefit schemes average close to three times those made by firms into
defined contribution and GPP schemes and six times those into stakeholder
schemes.”38
It is important to keep these types of comparisons in perspective as they are
influenced by a range of factors. DB schemes certainly are paying a higher
employer contribution at present but in many cases this follows years of
contribution holidays and the significant use of surpluses in the 1980s and 1990s
to fund early retirement and redundancy programmes. The removal of advanced
corporation tax (ACT) relief in 1997, the bear market of 2000-2002, and
increasing longevity have all put pressure on employers to raise contributions. 
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The disparity between GPPs and stakeholders is not difficult to explain. Bearing in
mind our comments about the more flexible adviser remuneration available on
GPP contracts, it is likely that this has created the market distortion between total
GPP and stakeholder contributions. While EBCs do implement attractive
stakeholder schemes, the stakeholder is also the preferred choice for employers
that do not want to pay any contributions and therefore “average” contribution
figures for these schemes are meaningless. 
There is a wide gulf between the levels of contribution employees need to pay in
order to retire on an adequate income, and what they are actually paying. Raising
the employee contribution rate is likely to be counter-productive and may result in
people leaving the scheme. This is an important and difficult issue for the
government to tackle in its debate over the voluntary vs. compulsory arguments. 
In this context it is worth pointing out that compulsion in Australia started at a very
low level – initially 3% for employers with phased increases over a period of years
to 9%. 
Whatever steps the government takes it may have to accept that a generation is
going to reach retirement with very inadequate private provision. This will
represent an increased cost to the government and therefore to future taxpayers.
We also favour the concept of employees agreeing to direct part of their future
wage increases into their pension plans. The (limited) US evidence suggests the
Save More Tomorrow ™ (“SMART”) idea works well. The key contributing factor 
is “money illusion” – that take home pay never falls  – and the scheme uses the
inertia shown by many pension scheme members to positive effect. Even if
employees are prepared to allocate 1% of salary from their annual pay rise over 
a period of a few years this will have a very meaningful impact on the resulting
retirement income.
In the US, the results of Thaler and Benartzi’s “real life” implementation of the
SMART plan at a mid-sized manufacturing firm show considerable success.39
The company’s 315 employees were offered the chance to see an investment
consultant and discuss their retirement provision and most agreed to do so. In
many cases the employees were told their current savings rate was inadequate,
but only 28% were willing to accept the advice and make an immediate increase
in contributions. The rest of the participants were offered the chance to join the
“SMART” plan, which would increase their saving rate by 3% a year starting from
their next pay rise. Of the 207 participants who were unwilling to accept the
contribution rate advice of the investment consultant, 162 (78%) agreed to join
SMART, with 80% of these participants remaining in the plan through four pay
rises. The average savings rate for these participants rose from 3.5% to 13.6%
over the course of 40 months. Thaler and Benartzi also report encouraging results
from other implementations of the plan, albeit that the constraints of real life
implementation mean the data is limited and ‘clean tests’ are hard to achieve. 
In particular, the authors are unable to show whether or not the increased 401(k)
contributions are offset by reduced saving (or increased borrowing) elsewhere. 
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7B. Retirement management issues ahead
The shorter-term cost savings achieved through poor participation rates will create
longer-term staff management problems. One of the largely forgotten reasons for
offering company defined benefit pensions is that they enable employers to
manage staff retirements to suit their requirements and the economic climate.
Companies that do not encourage staff to build up attractive pensions will find
that the government’s anti age-discrimination laws will make it very difficult for
them to shed older unproductive staff, who need to continue working because they
cannot afford to retire.
This will also be a problem for government. A lot of the unproductive workers end
up on disability benefits, which in most cases are paid by the state – i.e. the
taxpayer.40 When they do retire, their accrued pension will be so low that they will
become eligible for means-tested benefits – again placing a burden on the state
and the taxpayer. Therefore it is the future taxpayer who faces consequences of
current problems with poorly designed and poorly funded private sector pension
schemes. This, of course, is what the pensions timebomb is really about.
DC does not confer the flexibility of DB as a human resources tool. It can be used
to attract but its use as a staff retention tool is highly questionable. Nor is it a
resource for restructuring – for example to provide early retirements on enhanced
terms, so as a retirement management tool it is defective.
This does not imply that companies must rebuild the pension scheme as a
retirement management tool. Many will prefer to make cash payments where this
proves necessary. This practice is already evident for higher earners, particularly in
the City, and could spread down the earnings scale where it is not possible to keep
people economically active after age 65, for example in manual jobs where age is
a genuine issue.
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Section 8. Communication – and not scheme design – is  the
key to successful take-up; regulation of advice is a barrier
8.1 Current regulatory system undermines the clear message on private
pensions
Given the bad publicity pensions have attracted in recent years and the impact of
the bear market on DC funds, communicating a positive message is all the more
essential and at the same time a tougher proposition. The perception of the
pension scheme as a valuable and reliable company benefit has been eroded.
The ACA reports that half of the smaller companies it surveyed said that the bad
climate for pensions had undermined both the promotion of pensions and the
perceived value of their schemes. “This is particularly worrying in a defined
contribution world where higher pension contributions are needed to build more
meaningful pensions than are going to be delivered at current contribution
rates.”41
Advisers encourage employers to allocate the right level of resources to
communications.
“If the employer is prepared to contribute 10% on behalf of employees we encourage
them to think of this cost as a 9% contribution and 1% communications spend. If the
spend is 5% then the employer should see this as 4 plus 1.” EBC
It is important to remember that the adviser’s client is the employer and not the
individual employee; therefore it is the adviser’s job to endorse the employer’s
financial commitment to staff pensions.
“An important part of our communications process is to promote the employer’s
commitment to the employees and to demonstrate how this commitment translates into
financial benefits.” IFA
At the same time advisers are struggling with very low levels of financial literacy
among employees. We should not underestimate this, nor overestimate the speed
at which financial literacy taught in schools will feed through into the consumer
market in general.42
“Very little research has been carried out on making DC schemes work in the SME
market where funding is very tight.This is both tragic and pathetic given that we’re fast
moving into a DC pensions environment.A related key point is the almost non-exist
level of financial education amongst the population at large.” EBC
Advisers feel that the government devotes too much attention to technical issues
and does not recognise the importance of positive and enthusiastic
communications.
“The government fails to grasp the importance of communications and instead focuses on
pricing and technical details. Pensions need to be sold – and I say that as a fee-based
adviser working in an employee benefits consultancy.” EBC
“Employees want to feel empowered to make a decision to join and to invest in the right
funds.We have to work hard to achieve this level of confidence, particular if we are
communicating a scheme change.” EBC
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“We must not underestimate the difficulties of explaining a change from the complex
contracted out money purchase schemes [COMPS] that were sold at the end of the
1980s and early 1990s to a modern group personal pension or stakeholder scheme. It is
highly unlikely that members understood the COMP in the first place.Now we have to
tell them that they are being offered the opportunity – or in some cases being given an
ultimatum – to leave a scheme they didn’t understand for something ‘better’.” EBC
“There are very few greenfield sites in the SME market.Employers that have an old-
style DC scheme have a huge millstone around their necks.The government should
consider giving a grant to employers that tried to do the right thing in implementing a
COMPS.These employers and the scheme members have a much tougher job ahead
than those that did nothing and have merely made a stakeholder available to staff since
2001.” EBC
“DC to DC takes a huge amount of time to sort out.We have to review contract terms,
the investment choices, and any early termination penalties, among other points.While
major pension providers have changed their contract terms for the retail market, very few
have changed the terms on their occupational schemes.There is no incentive for them to
do this.” EBC
8.2 Employees do not distinguish between regulated and generic advice
Employees do not recognise or understand the difference between explicit
regulated advice and the implicit recommendations of non-regulated advice. 
Our research indicates that where an employer or an adviser provides generic
advice about the benefits of joining and the merits of the default investment
option, employees believe they have been given specific advice to join and to
accept the default fund.43
In practice the difference between regulated advice – which must have a due
diligence audit trail – and non-regulated advice, is not understood or even
recognised by the employee. What this means is that the firms of advisers that 
give generic, non-regulated advice – which avoids the due diligence of FSA fully
regulated advice – can provide a very clear steer, with the effect that employees
feel they have been advised to join and advised to opt for the default fund. 
From the individual’s point of view advice is perceived in a broad context.
Employees are generally unaware of the complexity of regulated advice and find it
difficult to appreciate why the employer or adviser will not answer what appear to
be straightforward questions, such as “do you think I should join the scheme?”
and “should I go for the default option?”
Generic advice is taken as direct recommendations.
“We’ve seen examples of so-called generic advice that is so channelled that it becomes
obvious to the employees what they should do. It is spurious to suggest that this isn’t
individual advice.” IFA
“Everyone in this industry, including the employers, is worried about crossing regulatory
boundaries inadvertently. People look for a scapegoat in advance in case something
unforeseen goes wrong at a later date.” IFA
The fear of offering regulated advice inadvertently, therefore, is a barrier to
communications for the employer and the adviser. 
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8.3 Varied communication techniques essential
There is a high degree of consensus among providers and advisers that the wider
the range of media employed to communicate the scheme the better. Some
employees like a plain English booklet; some respond well to a video or intranet
presentation; yet others will only really take in information on a one-to-one or
small group basis.
No matter how sophisticated the campaign the objective is to put the employee in
the position where he or she can answer the following questions: 
• Should I join?
• How do I join?
• How much is the employer paying?
• How much should I pay?
• What do I invest in?
• What happens if I die?
Advisers report success in terms of high take-up by using a combination of the
following:
• An employee survey, to make staff feel part of the process.
• Making the presentation during induction day, which locates the pension 
scheme as a key element of the company package, rather than as a separate 
item.
• The use of posters gets the employees’ attention. These can announce the 
importance of a good retirement income and flag up the forthcoming change to
the scheme, where relevant.
• Small group presentations work well and can be followed by one-to-one 
sessions and/or the opportunity to talk through issues informally with the 
adviser. The employer must be prepared to allow groups to take time off, and to 
allow the adviser to conduct back-to-back sessions so that the entire workforce 
can be covered within a matter of days or weeks, depending on the number of 
employees and sites.
• Presentation time ideally should be in working hours rather than after work. A 
half-and-half approach is acceptable, ie where the presentation session starts in
the employee’s working time but continues beyond this.
• The adviser’s objective should be to achieve a high participation rate at this 
initial presentation, and so an important part of their work is to show employees 
how to complete the form and to leave enough time to help them where 
necessary. Until recently the forms resembled the lengthy self-assessment tax 
return but today this whole procedure is simplified where the adviser and 
employer use pre-populated forms in a streamlined joining process. 
“The application process is the biggest barrier. Simplified enrolment is a great
improvement but the employee still has to make the investment choice.” EBC
“We recommend that all employees go in to the default investment option at the time of
joining so they don’t have to worry about investment.They can change their mind later.” IFA
“We used to do 40 minute presentations.Now we do 30-minute presentations and
spend 10 minutes on the application form,which employees collect on the way in.This is
pre-populated with information provided by the employer so there is a minimal input
from the individual.” EBC
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“We used to give people the forms and let them walk away with two or three weeks to
decide.That didn’t work.Now we urge them to fill in the form as soon as possible,
preferably on the spot.” EBC
• Where the employees are given a period of time to consider membership this 
should be short and a firm deadline imposed. A countdown to this deadline 
through email and poster reminders helps.
“If we can’t get employees to sign up on the spot then we send out a card giving them a
deadline that is very tight.We get twice the level of joiners this way than if we say
membership of the scheme is an open-ended option.” IFA
• Regular pension “surgeries”, where the adviser is available once per quarter to 
answer questions, will encourage non-joiners to apply for membership.
A plain English pack of information is a must. 
“We always ensure the written communication covers everything in plain English, even
where the whole process can be handled online. Some of the older employees are very
keen to use the online facilities but they forget their passwords after a few weeks and go
back to the scheme booklet.We also make sure there is a paper annual statement.” IFA
• To cover technical issues advisers report that FSA leaflets are very effective, for 
example on transfers, annuities, and income drawdown (www.fsa.gov.uk). 
“The FSA is happy to provide these in bulk for adviser presentations.Handing out
leaflets written by the regulator is a great way to reinforce the message. It also provides us
with a robust audit trail.We can hardly be accused of failing to give proper advice when
we are using the FSA’s own literature.” EBC
• Video presentations are effective where the company has multiple sites and 
where there are shift workers, for example, that cannot attend the live sessions.
• Internet/intranet information sites are appreciated by many, but not all 
employees. The more sophisticated providers can offer full internet decision-
making, for example members can change fund choice, increase or decrease 
the contribution. Clearly this does not work where employees do not have access
to a terminal.
“Where we use online applications the technology must work.We took on a client whose
existing scheme relied on on-line applications but the IT let it down and there was no
support from the adviser.To re-establish confidence we installed the new scheme on a
paper-enrolment basis.The employees had had enough of the online approach.” IFA
“Many members will continue to prefer the complex issues surrounding pensions and
benefit schemes to be explained via face-to-face personal consultations backed up by easy
to understand paper based booklets and leaflets. However,we are finding that an
increasing number wish to access these details via the internet.” IFA
• Online planners that help employees to assess how much they need to save for 
retirement are proving increasingly popular.
• Dedicated help lines provided by the adviser or the provider. 
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“We can handle thousands of calls if we give staff a dedicated helpline number.This is a
very efficient way of handling generic and technical queries. It’s particularly helpful where
employees are being asked to leave an existing scheme that is going to be closed to future
accrual and to join the new DC scheme.Other difficult situations where the helpline is
invaluable include any corporate activity, for example a takeover.” EBC
• Including the value of the pension in total reward statements helps raise the 
scheme’s value – and quantify the loss of benefit if the employee is not in the 
scheme.
The time frame is important. Advisers and providers to companies of all sizes
report that a slow drip feed of eye-catching information over three months is far
better than a single hit with lengthy documents. However, advisers were critical of
insurance key features documents, which they say are too long and unfocused.
“We’ve found that brief announcement where the contents are well signposted are
generally received better than more detailed, heavyweight documentation.At the other
extreme, however,we find that the provider’s key features and accompanying
documentation rarely provide sufficiently rounded information for members to make truly
informed decisions.” EBC
8.4 Segmentation of workforce for communications media
Large consultants tend to target communications at different types of employee.
They segment the workforce according to ‘hard’ facts, such as age, sex, and
salary. Typically there might be three broad employee profiles:
• Young and in debt: age 20-40
• High family expenses: age 40-47
• Pre-retirement: age 47+
Communications and design specialists tend to segment according to soft data,
such as the employee’s attitude to money and to pensions – in other words the
communications material is geared towards the way employees think. Their focus
is on making pensions personal – using a phrase that employees can relate to,
such as “salary for life”, and making limited use of the company’s corporate
image, such as the logo and colours. However, the cost of the initial employee
survey required to implement this would be about £25,000, while the agency’s
costs would double this. 
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Comment
8A. Generic financial education material required
It would seem to be a waste of resources for each provider and adviser to produce
a full range of communications material. The use of FSA leaflets helps reduce cost
and providing consistency in the information and presentation.
A good source of generic financial literacy information, guides, and “courses” is
the Pre-Retirement Association, which is supported by a rather limited number of
organisations at present. The PRA might be an ideal independent and charitable
organisation to provide material directly to employers and to advisers and
providers. The website is at www.pra.uk.com and the financial education material
is at www.learnaboutmoney.org.44
8B. More detailed employee profiling essential
The closer profiling of employees based on segmentation that is used by the larger
consultants and the communications agencies may have some useful messages
for the SME. While the massive press and employee communications programme
used by Barclays for its After Work pension scheme would be beyond the scope of
smaller employers we feel that medium sized companies could make some use of
the “hard profiling” – that is material focused on the age/income profile of the
employees. We think that the larger IFAs and EBCs should be able to provide this.
8C. Online planners should be developed as a user-friendly aid
More work on online retirement planners is required as it is likely that these will
represent an increasingly important feature of communications for SMEs. A well-
designed online planner can help employees to understand the following:
• How much income they may need in retirement. Few people have any clear idea
of what this should be and the two-thirds final salary model is arbitrary and in 
most cases unachievable.
• Their risk tolerance. The consensus among advisers is that the majority of 
employees have no idea how to judge this. If offered three choices or five, 
generally they will passively select the middle option rather than make an active 
selection.
• The level of contribution they should pay at the outset
• Regular checks to ensure contributions increase if necessary in the light of 
performance experience
Online planners that can be used by individuals without advice and with a very
limited level of financial knowledge are in the developmental stages. So far, user-
friendly internet models have tended to offer a very restrictive projection that takes
account of the income that might be achieved based on future DC contributions.
Some include the state pension. The more sophisticated models are suitable only
for the more sophisticated investor or for use with the financial adviser’s
assistance. Dynamic Planner from Distribution Technology (www.distribution-
technology.com), for example, is primarily designed to assist the adviser complete
fact-finds more speedily, whereas Alexander Forbes Financial Services’ planner
(www.retireontarget.com) is designed to be used by individuals without technical
support.
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In 2006 the DWP aims to launch its own planner. This should accommodate
previous benefits and take account of current state and private provision.45
Not all advisers are fans of these facilities, however. We acknowledge those that
expressed concern over the “spurious sense of accuracy” they offer the user, which
leads us to our next point.
8D. Standard projections do not show risks
Opinion is divided over how best we can illustrate risk and projections to the
layperson. The standard projection rates used in DC pension statements and in
retirement modellers are unrealistic since they assume constant investment returns
and earnings growth up to age 65. However, the mid-range constant investment
return of 7% permitted by the FSA for projections does appear to be a reasonably
reliable average gross return for an investment 80% invested in equities.46
The FSA allows the use of stochastic or Monte Carlo modelling but at present these
projections can only be shown in addition to rather than instead of the prescribed
projections. Advisers feel strongly that providing two very different sets of
projections would confuse rather than clarify the risks. The FSA currently is
examining the options for alternative systems.
Some advisers point out that a range of projected outcomes is better than a single
figure, albeit calculated on a more realistic basis. This is because setting out a
range of figures helps to express the uncertainty of outcome, whereas there may
be a danger that a single figure would be taken as a guarantee.
Clearly, we need to strike a balance. Projections must not give the impression of a
guarantee but nor should they be so frightening or confusing that people are put
off and do nothing. We do feel that such modellers should spell out more clearly
that while projection rates attempt to deal with investment risk, there are other
important risks including the assumed stability and indexation of the contribution
payments, and the annuity risk in terms of the conversion from the accumulated
fund to a regular income, which will depend on long-dated gilt yields, among
other unpredictable factors. 
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Section 9. Conclusion 
In this report we have identified where the real barriers to greater participation 
lie in the smaller and medium sized company pensions market and we have
highlighted strategies that will help to overcome these obstacles. 
We believe that the innovative methodology of this Pensions Institute Practitioner
Report demonstrates that it is possible to make positive contributions to the
consultation process by using an independent and multi-disciplinary approach,
which combines academic standards of research with a uniquely informed
understanding of the market.
We hope that in future the government, employers and practitioners will consider
the important role of this type of research in their consultations and build on this
methodology.
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Glossary of terms
Accrual rate In defined benefit pension schemes this the rate at which a member’s
benefits builds up for each year – for example one-sixtieth of final salary.
Additional pension The generic term used to describe the state second pension
(S2P), introduced in 2002, and its predecessor the state earnings related pension
scheme (Serps).
Additional voluntary contribution (AVC) An investment used to top up benefits
from a company pension scheme up to limits permitted by the Inland Revenue.
Annual management charge (AMC) The fund management charge.
Annuity Sold by insurance companies, these guarantee to pay a regular taxable
income usually for life in return for a lump sum investment from the proceeds of a
pension plan. Retirement annuities are priced on the basis of prevailing long-term
interest rates and assumptions about the likely longevity of the person buying the
annuity. Other things being equal a given level of annuity will become more
expensive to purchase as long-term interest rates fall. This can be hedged by
holding a portfolio of bonds that will increase in value as long-term interest rates
fall.
Annuity rate The annual rate of income provided by an annuity in return for the
investment of a lump sum (expressed as a percentage of the lump sum).
Buy-out cost The full cost of purchasing immediate and deferred annuities to meet
a pension scheme’s liabilities to its active and retired members.
Career averaged revalued earnings (or average salary) scheme A type of
defined benefit scheme that links the accrual to average earnings over the full
career (where the earnings in each year are uprated to the retirement date by the
intervening price or wage inflation) rather than final salary.
Cash balance Members are credited with a cash amount, usually expressed as a
percentage of salary, for each year of service. These sums are revalued over the
period to retirement at a fixed and pre-set rate of return with a discretionary top
up. On retirement the member’s fund is used to purchase an annuity or the
pension fund itself can provide this income.
Commission This is paid by the provider to the intermediary and is usually
expressed as a percentage of the contribution. The initial commission often is a
larger sum paid upfront whereby the provider takes into account the expected
commission that otherwise would be earned over the entire investment period.
‘Trail’ commission is a smaller percentage of contributions paid from the first
anniversary of the scheme implementation.
Commutation Swapping pension for tax-free cash.
Contracted in money purchase scheme (CIMPS) These are occupational money
purchase (DC) schemes that are contracted in to the state second pension scheme,
so that they pay benefits in addition to S2P. They build up a fund in the same way
as a personal pension but in most cases the contribution and benefit rules are
those of final salary schemes. 
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Contracted out money purchase scheme (COMPS) These schemes, sold in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, are occupational money purchase (DC) schemes
contracted out of the state second pension, so that they replace the S2P benefit.
They build up a fund in the same way as a personal pension but the contribution
and benefit rules are those of final salary schemes.
Contribution match We use the term “contribution match” to denote an employer
contribution that is equal to the employee’s – for example a 5% of annual
earnings employer contribution would be paid for every employee who joined and
agreed to pay 5%. It can also be used to denote a tiered employer contribution
rate that rises in line with the employee’s commitment to pay a higher rate.
Corporate IFA The Financial Services Authority-regulated independent financial
advisers who sell group pensions in the SME market. 
Default DC investment A predetermined investment option for defined
contribution pension schemes and plans that makes the asset allocation and fund
management choices. 
Deferred pension A pension benefit – usually in a former employer’s scheme –
that will be paid when the individual reaches the scheme’s official pension age.
Defined benefit (DB) A type of occupational pension scheme that links the benefit
to earnings.
Defined contribution (DC) A type of company and individual pension
arrangement that invests contributions to build up a fund, which generally is used
to buy an annuity at retirement. Also known as “money purchase”.
Depolarisation Under depolarisation, to be introduced at the end of 2004,
advisers are allowed to call themselves “independent” only if they make advice
available, but not compulsory, on a fee basis to clients. Advisers who arrange ties
with several product providers will be known as “multi-tied”.
EBC Employee benefits consultant. Traditionally this would be an actuarial firm
that provides a full range of employee benefits consulting and in most cases
investment consulting as well. Fee based by culture, EBCs in the SME market
usually are prepared to offset sales commissions against their fee.
Enhanced annuity An annuity that pays an above average income or rate
because the individual has a lifestyle feature, such as smoking or obesity, that will
lower life expectancy.
Fee Advisers who charge clients a fee relate their remuneration to an explicit
time/cost scale. There is no relationship between the fee and the size of the annual
contributions, as there is with the commission basis of remuneration. Commission
usually is offset against the fee, although in some cases advisers can negotiate
commission-free products, where more of the individual’s contribution is actually
invested.
Group personal pension (GPP) Although sold as a ‘group’ scheme, a GPP is a
series of individual personal pension contracts. The grouping is relevant because it
reduces costs.
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Impaired life annuity An annuity that pays a higher than average rate because
the individual has a lower than average life expectancy on account of some
terminal illness such as cancer. 
Income drawdown This allows an individual with a personal pension fund to draw
an income directly and keep the fund invested, rather than buy an annuity.
Initial commission See commission. 
Investment-linked annuity An annuity that invests the capital in order to provide
an income with a stockmarket link.
Large cap Companies with a high market capitalization, generally used to refer to
those in the FTSE 100 index.
Managed fund In the insurance sector this is a fund defined by the Association of
British Insurers, which has minimum and maximum parameters for asset class
weightings. Such funds are run by a single provider that is responsible for asset
allocation within the required parameters, and investment style. 
Market capitalisation The stockmarket valuation of the company, which is
calculated by multiplying the number of shares in issue by their market price.
Means-tested benefit A social security benefit that is only available where the
individual can prove eligibility – usually by providing evidence that total earnings
and capital fall below certain levels.
Mid-cap Companies with a mid-ranking market capitalisation. In the UK this
usually refers to companies in the FTSE Mid-250 index
Minimum funding requirement (MFR) A method for valuing defined benefit
pension liabilities (and hence the required asset levels) established by the 1995
Pensions Act. Shortly to be abolished.
Mis-selling An advised sale that does not meet the Financial Services Authority’s
standards. This is a regulatory offence and the FSA has statutory powers to
investigate and impose fines.
Monte Carlo modelling See stochastic modelling.
Mortality A measure of life expectancy.
Multi-employer/industry-wide scheme A single occupational pension scheme to
which the employees from a range of employers (usually in the same sector) have
access.
Mutual A life office owned by its policyholders.
Open architecture A product/platform through which the provider offers access
to the funds of a selection of external managers in addition to its own.
Open market option (OMO) The facility to take the DC pension fund from the
provider in order to buy a more competitive annuity elsewhere.
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Pension credit A means tested benefit for pensioners, which replaced the
minimum income guarantee in October 2003. 
Pension tax simplification On 6 April 2006 (“A-Day”) the government will
introduce a new simplified tax regime for all private occupational and personal
plans. The new regime includes the following features:
• A single tax regime; the eight existing tax regimes for occupational and 
individual pension arrangements are reduced to one.
• Simpler guidelines for maximum contributions: there will be an annual ceiling 
on tax-favoured contributions of 100% of earnings up to a ceiling, initially set at 
£215,000. 
• The lifetime allowance. Maximum benefits will be calculated over the entire 
career and tax-favoured treatment will only apply to those that do not to exceed 
the lifetime allowance, which is set at £1.5m for the 2006-2007 tax-year. Any 
pension funds in excess of this limit will suffer a tax charge of 55% (known as the
recovery charge), although it is possible to protect larger funds built up before A-
Day. To assess the impact, members of DB schemes, where the pension is 
expressed as a proportion of the salary at or near retirement, should multiply 
their accrued pension by 20, to convert it to a monetary fund. A final salary 
pension worth £75,000pa, therefore, is equal to the £1.5m cap. 
Polarisation A regulatory system under which advisers were either tied to one
provider for the distribution of one or more products or were independent
financial advisers (IFAs), who could select products from the entire range
available. Depolarisation replaces polarisation at the end of 2004.
Risk The chance of the actual outcome falling short of the expected outcome.  In
financial terms, risk is often measured by the standard deviation of the return on
an investment. If the expected return is 10% and the standard deviation is 4%, then
there is approximately a one-in-six chance that the actual return will be below 6%.
For individuals we think of risk in terms of loss of capital, but also in terms of
failing to achieve a personal investment objective.  
Small cap Companies with a comparatively small market capitalization.
Generally taken as those below the FTSE 350, which fall into the FTSE Small 
Cap index.
Small and medium sized enterprises (SME) SME is variously defined but typically
this is a private or public company with up to 250 employees.
Smoothed managed fund Operates like a unit-linked managed fund but with a
separate mechanism for a limited degree of smoothing the annual returns.
Statutory money purchase illustration (SMPI) The annual illustration of the
retirement income, in today’s prices, that a defined contribution pension plan will
generate.
Stochastic (Monte Carlo) modelling A method for determining the possible
distribution of outcomes from a process where the inputs determining the process
fluctuate randomly over time. In the case of a portfolio of investment assets, the
process is the accrual over time of gains and losses to the value of the portfolio
arising from the random fluctuations in the returns on the assets held in the
portfolio. Once the distribution of returns on assets is specified, artificial ‘histories’
of asset returns can be created by random drawings from the underlying
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distribution. Each history will result in a different value for the portfolio at the end
of an investment horizon. At least 500 (and usually somewhere between 1000
and 5000) histories are needed to generate a reasonable distribution of portfolio
values. The results are usually expressed in terms of key properties of the
distribution such as the median (the value of the 50th percentile) and the first and
fourth quartile values (the values of the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively). 
Tied agent Until late in 2004 the system of regulation demanded that advisers
were either tied, where they could only sell the products of one company, or
independent, where they could select products from across the entire market. See
depolarisation.
Trail commission See commission. 
Transfer value The cash value of a pension that is provided when a scheme
member requests a transfer to a new employer’s scheme or to a private plan. TVs
usually refer to transfers from a defined benefit scheme, as here it is necessary to
calculate the cash equivalent of the DB benefits accrued, which will be expressed
as a proportion of salary.
Trust A legal structure that recognizes there are two owners of assets – the trustees,
of whom there must be at least two and who have legal control of the assets (and
are formally the legal owners), and the beneficiaries (who are the beneficial
owners). 
Trustee The legal owner and controller of the assets in a trust; the intermediary
between the person setting up the trust (the settlor, in the case of a pension
scheme, the employer) and the people benefiting from the trust (the beneficiaries,
in the case of a pension scheme, the members).  
Vesting (a) The process of transferring the ownership of assets in a trust to the
beneficiaries. (b) The process of converting a pension plan into income or an
income-generating arrangement such as an annuity; vesting also enables the
individual to gain access to the tax-free cash.
With-profits annuity An investment linked annuity that links the income mainly to
the returns achieved by the underlying with-profits fund.
With-profits fund A fund that invests in equities, bonds and property, pays an
annual bonus or return and in addition pays a final or terminal bonus. Returns are
smoothed to avoid significant fluctuations. 
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About the Pensions Institute
The objectives of the Pensions Institute (www.pensions-institute.org) are to
undertake high quality research in all fields related to pensions, to communicate
the results of that research to the academic and practitioner community, to
establish an international network of pensions researchers from a variety of
disciplines, and to provide expert independent advice to the pensions industry and
government.
We take a fully multidisciplinary approach. For the first time disciplines such as
economics, finance, insurance, and actuarial science through to accounting,
corporate governance, law and regulation have been brought together in order to
enhance strategic thinking, research and teaching in pensions.
As the first and only UK academic research centre focused entirely on pensions, PI
unites some of the world’s leading experts in these fields in order to offer an
integrated approach to the complex problems that arise in this field.
Objectives
The Pensions Institute undertakes research in a wide range of fields, including:
· Pension Microeconomics 
The economics of individual and corporate pension planning, 
long-term savings and retirement decisions. 
· Pension Fund Management and Performance
The investment management and investment performance of occupational 
and personal pension schemes. 
· Pension Funding and Valuations
The actuarial and insurance issues related to pension schemes, including risk 
management, asset-liability management, funding, scheme design, annuities, 
and guarantees. 
· Pension Law and Regulation
The legal aspects of pension schemes and pension fund management. 
· Pension Accounting, Taxation and Administration
The operational aspects of running pension schemes. 
· Marketing
The practice and ethics of selling group and individual pension products. 
· Macroeconomics of Pensions
The implications of aggregate pension savings and the impact of the size 
and maturity of pension funds on other sectors of the economy.
· Public Policy 
Domestic and EU social policy towards pension provision and other employee 
benefits in the light of factors such as the Social Chapter of the Maastrict Treaty 
and the demographic developments in Europe and other countries. 
Research disseminated by the Pensions Institute may include views on policy but
the Pensions Institute itself takes no institutional policy positions.
Delivering DC?
                     
1 The DTI statistics are drawn from the Association of Consulting Actuaries 2004 Smaller Firms 
Pension Survey: A Nation Divided, May 2004. For further details go to www.aca.org.uk 
2 Office for National Statistics figures based on VAT-registrations show: 410,000 enterprises 
employing between 5 and 249 people, giving a total of over 8m people; 6,000 enterprises 
between 250 and 999 employees, totalling 3m people. 
3 Source: Office for National Statistics.
4 ACA, Smaller Firms, p.6.
5 TUC press release dated 17 August 2004.
6 Hewitt Bacon & Woodrow, ‘DC & AVC Survey 2004’. See ‘Scheme Survey, p. 3. 
7 Momentum, now part of Origen, included some interesting but limited data on pension scheme 
design and employee turnover in its 2004/5 Employee Benefits Survey. Tel: 01252 557404.
8 ACA, 2004 Smaller Firms Pension Survey, p. 12.
9 RSM Robson Rhodes Pensions Survey 2004. www.rsm.co.uk 
10 See for example, Benartzi S. and R. Thaler (2004) ‘Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioural 
Economics to Increase Employee Saving’ Journal of Political Economy 112:1 pp S164-S187.
11 See for example, Choi J., D. Laibson, and B. Madrian (2004) ‘Plan Design and 401(k) Savings 
Outcomes’ National Tax Journal Vol. LVII  No. 2:1, pp275-298.
12 Source: Office for National Statistics. The ONS defines low earners as those earning less than 60% 
of median household income. In terms of low earners, 25% of full time employees earn less than 
£13,800 – close to 60% of NAE. Clearly the figure of 6.6m includes many very low earners and 
part-timers, who would automatically rely on state benefits.
13 The assumptions for these annuity rates are: male 65, spouse 62, 3% escalation, spouse’s pension 
of 50%, paid monthly in advance, no guaranteed period. Source: Hargreaves Lansdown.
14 It is a statutory requirement for all employers with five or more employees to provide access to 
some form of pension scheme to all employees earning over the National Insurance lower 
earnings limit. The minimum requirement is to designate a stakeholder scheme where the 
employer has a contract with a provider and receives a designation certificate. Employers can 
avoid having to pay an employee contribution if they offer access to a stakeholder scheme, rather 
than a group personal pension, for example, into which they must pay a minimum employer 
contribution of 3%. The NI lower earnings limit for 2004-2005 is £79 per week, or £4,108 p.a. 
15 According to the ONS, 25% of full time employees earn less than £13,780 pa – which equates to 
4.5m employees, Over 7m people work for enterprises that employ less than 50 employees.
16 Source: Professional Pensions, 22 June 2004.
17 DWP, ‘Simplicity, security and choice’, p. 14.
18 Hewitt Bacon & Woodrow’ DC & AVC Survey 2004’, Scheme Survey, p. 4.  Elsewhere, Mercer 
estimates the government would have to pay an additional £3.8bn a year in rebates to make them 
attractive across the board (source: press release dated 5 July 2004).
19 The maximum student loan in 2004-2005 is £5,050 for students living in London and away from 
home.
20 Many group personal pensions and contracted out money purchase schemes sold in the late 
1980s and early- to mid-1990s had high initial charges and exit penalties, and offered inadequate
asset management.
21 Career averaged revalued earnings schemes are a type of defined benefit scheme that links the 
accrual to average earnings over the full career (where the earnings in each year are uprated to 
the retirement date by the intervening price or wage inflation) rather than to final salary. This 
structure reduces the employer’s exposure to volatility and to the impact of high salary increases in 
the employee’s final years. With a cash balance scheme members are credited with a cash 
amount, usually expressed as a percentage of salary, for each year of service. These sums are 
revalued over the period to retirement at a fixed rate of return with a discretionary top up. On 
retirement the member’s fund is used to purchase an annuity with an insurance company, or in 
some cases this is provided by the scheme. This reduces the employer’s risk in the same way as 
CARE schemes but also reduces the exposure to wage inflation and, where annuities are 
purchased from an insurance company, to longevity.
22 During this period, insurance companies sold several thousand “contracted out money purchase 
schemes” (COMPS). These build up a fund in the same way as a personal pension but the 
contribution and benefit rules are those of final salary schemes. At the time it was beneficial to 
contract out of the second state pension (then called Serps) as the rebates of national insurance 
contributions were considered attractive compared with the value of state pension benefits given up.
23 This estimate is a very broad-brush figure as in practice the levy will depend on the specific scheme 
and the risks associated with the employer (i.e. the levy is risk-based).
24 Welfare Reform & Pensions Act 1999, Section 3 (8) reads as follows:
(3) Duty of employers to facilitate access to stakeholder pension schemes [...]
(8) An employer is not, whether before designating a scheme for the purposes of subsection 
(2) or at any time while a scheme is designated by him for those purposes, under any duty -
(a) to make any enquiries, or act on any information, about the scheme for any purpose not 
connected with 
(i) ascertaining whether the scheme is for the time being registered under section 2, 
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(ii) ascertaining the persons to whom it offers membership, or (iii) enabling him to comply with 
subsection (3), or
(b) in particular, to investigate or monitor, or make any judgment as to, the past, present or future 
performance of the scheme.  
25 To prevent solvent employers from walking away from underfunded pension scheme liabilities the 
Government now insists that schemes may only wind up if they secure all the accrued member 
rights through the purchase of immediate annuities for current pensioners, and deferred annuities 
for active (working) members.
26 Towers Perrin, Pension Financing in Europe: CFO Survey 2003. See also US consultant Greenwich 
Associates report, Stressful Problems, Possible Solutions on the Continent, (2003) which says that 
solvency ratios for pension funds in continental Europe are considerably lower than those in the 
US, UK and Canada. Of the Continental European companies surveyed a startling 57% were 
“technically insolvent” - in other words the liabilities far exceed the assets. Pension professionals 
from a range of countries who were interviewed for the report were adamant that employers 
should close their DB schemes and move to DC to reduce their costs and cap their exposure to 
increasing liabilities.
27 HM Treasury, ‘Consultation on “stakeholder” saving and investment products regulation’, June 
2004, p. 48.
28 Source: Financial Times, 19 May 2002
29 Source: Financial News, 21 June 2004.
30 See D. Blake, A. Byrne, A. Cairns and K. Dowd (2004) ‘The Stakeholder Pension Lottery: An
Analysis of the Default Funds in UK Stakeholder Pension Schemes’, Pensions Institute Working Paper 
(www.pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/wp0411.pdf). 
31 Source: Financial Times, May 8/9 2004, p. M23.
32 To put this in context, the Pensions Trust has an annual management charge of  0.21%. For the 
B&CE stakeholder there is no AMC for construction workers until 2006. These organisations do not
pay commission.
33 There are exceptions, for example the consultant Lane Clark & Peacock’s ‘DCisive’ model.
34 We note that in the US it is common to see an asset allocation manager engaged for DC pension 
schemes. Such organisations offer a highly streamlined IT system that allows them to set and 
monitor asset allocation for each employee, using the basic funds provided by the scheme.
35 See ‘Managed Strategies’, Scottish Life, and the first Myners report, ‘Institutional Investment in the 
UK; A Review’, page 9 (point 44) and page 148 (point 3), www.dwp.gov.uk.
36 See Note 30.
37 This is confirmed by the 2003 Employers’ Pension Provision Survey (conducted by the Department 
for Work and Pensions). Only 51% of the workforce joins non-contributory DB schemes (compared 
with 85% for contributory schemes); and only 27% of the workforce join non-contributory DC 
schemes (compared with 57% for contributory schemes). 
38 ACA, Smaller Firms, p. 4.
39 See footnote 11.
40 3.1m people were claiming sickness and disability benefit in the second quarter of 2004 – double 
the number on unemployment and lone parent’s benefits combined. Source: Financial Times, 16 
September, 2004.
41 ACA, Smaller Firms, p. 17.
42 Research based on survey data from pension scheme members shows many have very limited 
knowledge about savings and investment issues. See, for example,  A. Byrne (2004) ‘Employee 
Saving and Investment Decisions in Defined Contribution Pension Plans: Survey Evidence from the 
UK’, Pensions Institute Working Paper. (www.pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/wp0412.pdf)  
43 For example, in one scheme we have studied, over 50% of the members who reported that they 
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they had relied.  (Byrne 2004 cited above 
(www.pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/wp0412.pdf))
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